Edward Feser On The Iran Bombing

Last summer (here, here, and here) I looked at how the neo-Thomist philosopher Edward Feser treated what he calls "just war doctrine" as it relates to the B-2 mission to bomb Iran's nuclear program and the decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan.

What's increasingly troubled me about his reasoning is that he never quite spells out exactly what comprises "just war doctrine" in his arguments. He continues not to do this in a post on his blog from Saturday, The U.S. war on Iran is manifestly unjust. Instead, he cites piecemeal paraphrases, like

The war clearly does not meet just war conditions. First, the U.S. cannot claim a just cause.

. . . The war also does not meet the “lawful authority” condition of just war.

. . . For a war to be morally legitimate, that there are realistic prospects of success must be established before the fact, and a lucky break cannot retroactively make just what was entered into unjustly.

In fact, these are the only points of "just war doctrine" that he specifically cites. He may feel that if the justification for the Iran attack fails to meet only these points, these are sufficient to make the whole project unjust, but if he feels this way, he ignores the specific language of the doctine's most authoritative current expression, The Catechism of the Catholic Church paragraph 2309:

The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. the gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy. At one and the same time:

- the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;

- all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;

- there must be serious prospects of success;

- the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. the power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.

These are the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the "just war" doctrine. The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.

There are any number of possible general expressions of "just war doctrine", but as far as I've seen in Feser's writing, he's never referred to any explicit version, just an abstract "just war doctrine". But the doctine in CCC 2309 makes no mention of either "just cause" or "lawful authority" -- Feser just pulls this out of some other version. The only criterion he mentions that's actually contained in CCC 2309 relates to "prospects of success", but he uses the word "realistic" instead of "serious", for reasons he doesn't explain.

So let's go to Aquinas, something Prof Feser must certainly endorse. According to Chrome AI Mode,

Thomas Aquinas outlines his just war doctrine in the Summa Theologiae, Second Part of the Second Part (II-II), Question 40, titled "De bello" (On War). He establishes three necessary conditions for a war to be just: legitimate authority (sovereign)just cause (grave reason), and right intention (advancing good/avoiding evil).

Chrome Ai summarizes this in more detail:

1. Legitimate Authority (Auctoritas Principis): War must be declared by a lawful sovereign, not private individuals, who can defend the common good.
2. Just Cause (Causa Iusta): There must be a real, grave reason, such as defending against aggression or rectifying injustice.
3. Right Intention (Intentio Recta): The goal must be to promote good or avoid evil, not for revenge or territorial gain.

Aquinas himself mentions "just cause" and "lawful authority", but in the latter he distinguishes only between a legitimate nation-state and private parties, not whether internal constitutional niceties have been observed within the nation-state. He makes no menion of prospects of success. Any of these criteria may certainly be contained in anyone's idea of "just war doctrine", but this nevertheless goes to the point that "just war doctrine" is an abstract, amorphous concept, and any useful discussion needs to limit itself to a specific enumeration, which Feser never quite does.

In fact, I call hypostatization, which according to Wikipedia is "is a fallacy of ambiguity, when an abstraction (abstract belief or hypothetical construct) is treated as if it were a concrete real event or physical entity. In other words, it is the error of treating something that is not concrete, such as an idea, as a concrete thing." "Just war doctrine" is an abstract ambiguity that Prof Feser can claim is anything he wants. CCC 2309 is concrete and authoritative. I did hard time in graduate school. I know about professors.

But let's hold up CCC 2309 against the Iran attack.

"The damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain." Consider only the potential for nuclear weapons in this hands of the Iranian mullahs or their client terrorist organizations. Iranian leaders and military officials have repeatedly expressed the goal of destroying Israel and defeating the United States through official rhetoric, military planning, and state-sanctioned slogans.

"All other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective." Iran has a history of negotiating in bad faith and using it as a delaying tactic. The current concern is that Iran is rebuilding its nucelar capabilty under the putative cover of negotiation.

"There must be serious prospects of success." So far, use of electronic and stealth weapons under the current administration appears to have been highly successful.

"The use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. the power of modem means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition." The weapons currently in use are conventional explosives with highly accurate guidance systems, so that specific buildings and facilities of military use can be targeted almost exclusively, far more so than in any previous conficts. In fact, one specific goal of the current Iran attack is to eliminate their nuclear weapons program.

But beyond that, CCC 2309 concludes, "The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good." It's important to note that phrase "prudential judgment", which as far as I can tell, Feser doesn't cite, at least in his discussion of "just war doctrine". I asked Chrome AI mode, "What would be an example of 'prudential judgment' for Catholics?" It answered,

In Catholic teaching, prudential judgment is the application of moral principles to concrete, often complex, circumstances where there is no single "right" answer mandated by the Church. While the Church provides unchanging principles (e.g., "care for the poor"), it often leaves the means of achieving them to the conscience and reason of the faithful.

. . . The Just War Tradition provides criteria for conflict, but deciding if a specific modern war meets these criteria (such as "probability of success" or "last resort") requires a prudential judgment of complex geopolitical facts.

Prof Feaser, who is at least nominally Catholic, states flat out, "The war clearly does not meet just war conditions." But according to CCC 2309, this really isn't his decision to make. It belongs to US elected authorities using their prudential judgment. In fact, I asked Chrome AI mode, "Does Edward Feser ever discuss the term 'prucential judgment'?" It answered,

Yes, Edward Feser discusses the term "prudential judgment" extensively, particularly in the context of Catholic moral theology and public policy. His most prominent use of the term appears in his defense of the death penalty and his critiques of recent shifts in Church teaching.

. . . Feser argues that while some moral principles are fixed and infallible (e.g., the death penalty is not intrinsically evil), the application of those principles in specific historical circumstances is a matter of prudential judgment. He contends that Catholics are not bound to agree with a Pope's prudential judgment if they believe the assessment of circumstances is incorrect.

But it appears that while we're not bound to agree with a pope's prudential judgment on the death penalty, we are in fact bound to agree with Edward Feser's prudential judgtment on the B-2 bomber.

But luckily for us, Prof Feser's authority extends only within the walls of particular classrooms at Pasadena City College.