Bad Advice From Archbishop Broglio

Via The Pillar:

The archbishop of the U.S. military services said Sunday that he does not believe military action to take control of Greenland could be justified – and that U.S. troops in good conscience could refuse orders to do so.

Speaking to the BBC on Jan. 18. Archbishop Timothy Broglio of the Archdiocese for the Military Services said he “cannot see any circumstances” in which an American military operation to take control of Greenland or another ally’s territory could fulfill the criteria for a just war.

Asked whether he is concerned about Catholics serving in the military who might be asked to participate in a military operation to take control of Greenland, Broglio responded, “I am obviously worried, because they could be put in a situation where they’re being ordered to do something which is morally questionable.”

In this case, I think Abp Broglio is obscuring the difference between a clearly illegal order and one that a particular individual may feel violates his moral or philosophical principles. I asked Chrome AI mode, which is generally reliable on less controversial issues, "What happens if you refuse to obey a military order you think is illegal?" It answered in part,

In the U.S. military, you have both a legal right and an affirmative duty to disobey orders that are "manifestly illegal". However, doing so is legally perilous because you bear the burden of proof if the order is later determined to be lawful.

If you refuse an order you believe is illegal, you . . . will likely be detained and may face immediate charges of insubordination under Article 90 (willful disobedience of a superior officer) or Article 92 (failure to obey a lawful order) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

A military judge, not a jury, will ultimately determine the lawfulness of the order. If the order is found to be lawful, you face severe penalties including dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of pay, and up to two years of confinement (more in wartime).

. . . To be legally refused, an order must be manifestly unlawful, meaning its illegality is obvious to a person of ordinary sense.

A good example of the uncertainty surrounding what orders might be illegal is the case of the 1968 My Lai massacre. Although no soldiers involved refused alleged orders to kill civilian villagers, two officers, Captain Ernest Medina and Lieutenant William Calley, were court martialed for allegedly giving illegal orders. The evidence indicated that none of the orders, given verbally and recalled differently in different accounts, was explicitly illegal.

Medina was acquitted, while Calley, although convicted, appealed his case and eventually had his sentence considerably reduced. This suggests that in even that case, a soldier who refused orders that weren't clearly, unambiguously illegal would be on shaky ground if the matter reached court martial.

But this is a completely different matter from the situation Abp Broglio is outlining, where a Catholic soldier feels that a military seizure of Greenland violates just war doctrine and, for instance, refuses deployment. In this case, his order of deployment would be completely legal; he just finds it morally objectionable. I asked Chrome AI mode, "Could a military member legally refuse an order if he felt it violated just war doctrine?" It replied, in part,

In the U.S. military, a member can legally refuse an order only if it is unlawful. While just war doctrine informs international laws that the U.S. follows, a service member cannot legally refuse an order simply because they believe it violates the philosophical or moral principles of that doctrine.

. . . "Just war" doctrine is divided into two parts, and the law treats them differently:

Jus in bello (Conduct in War): If an order violates the legal rules of conduct (e.g., a war crime), a member must refuse it.

Jus ad bellum (Justice of War): Military members generally do not have the legal right to refuse to participate in a war they believe is unjust or lacks a legitimate cause. Personal, political, or philosophical disagreement with the war itself is not a legal defense for disobeying a lawful order to deploy or fight.

A good historical example is the case of the 1846-48 Mexican War, in which the US gained Texas, California, and the territory in between. This was as controversial at the time as the Viet Nam War was more than a century later. Ulysses S Grant in his autobiography explains how, as a young Army officer, he was personally opposed to the war, but he served and followed orders throughout. This would be the normal ethos in the US military, and any service member who refused orders on philosophical grounds would be justifiably court martialed. CCC 2309 tacitly acknowledges this after outlining the principles of just war doctrine:

The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.

According to Catholic Answers,

But unlike principles of doctrine and morality, the Church has not definitively taught which specific answers the faithful should embrace when it comes to implementing moral principles—like justice or care for the poor—in the public sphere.

In other words, the Church acknowledges that "those who have responsibility for the common good" have a degree of latitude in determining military policy, and it isn't up to individual Catholics to decide whether to refuse lawful orders -- and in this case, an order to deploy to Greenland would be lawful, just as much as then-Lieutenant Grant acknowledged that an order to deploy to Mexico was lawful.

It's unfortunate that Abp Broglio appears to be giving imperfect and unreliable advice to his flock in the military services.