Rope-a-Dope

Accordding to Wikipedia,

The rope-a-dope is a boxing fighting technique in which one contender draws non-injuring offensive punches (sometimes while leaning against the rope of the boxing ring) to let the opponent tire themselves out. This gives the former the opportunity to then execute devastating offensive maneuvers to help them win. The rope-a-dope is most famously associated with Muhammad Ali in his October 1974 Rumble in the Jungle match against world heavyweight champion George Foreman in Kinshasa, Zaire.

It seems to me that the Ukrainian strategy, as well as defeat in detail, which I've discussed here, is also rope-a-dope. So far, I haven't seen any analysis of the war that covers this, which is an argument for staying away from sites like ISW and spending time on the reddit /r ukraine conflict site. Here is a thread there based on a Twitter thread that quotes a Russian's detailed account of his deployment in Donbas:

. . . At the start of March the brigade moved towards Rubezhnoe. Advanced from north. As witnesses described, on one of the forest roads at the approach to the town the column stopped and sent forward reconnaissance. Reconnaissance discovered two Ukrainian strong points. Ukrainians were not suspecting anything. For 40 minutes at the brigade they were deciding what to do. In this time, Ukrainians spotted the column and opened heavy fire from mortars and artillery. In this attack, the military personnel of our battalion halved without entering combat. Further I'll be writing about my own battalion, since I'm not familiar with actions of others.

At the time, myself together with Vit'ka and Irishman were in Luhansk trying to join the war, I wrote about this here. The Irishman through his acquaintances in hospital was claiming some monstrous numbers of 200's [killed in action] and 300's, [wounded] but I didn't believe back then. As I realised later, we couldn't leave because those who were meant to transfer us were busy delivering 300's and identifying 200's. Later, at the battalion location, light wounded who were coming back confirmed the losses.

After this defeat the battalion dismounted and laid down. Frost, snow, we laid down under shelling for three days. Starting fires was forbidden. Frostbitten in large numbers were added to the existing losses. Basically, by the time of the assault, only about a third of personnel was left in the battalion.

Next, with support of brigade artillery there was an assault of the northern part of town with 5-9 storeys buildings. Ukrainians didn't defend them and fairly quickly fell back to prepared positions in the private residential areas. At the end of March, Chechens housed in these buildings and posted staged videos about them 'heroically' cleaning up the 5-storey houses that were cleared two days before them.

Yet what began next was a complete f*ckery. As a strong point the Ukrainians used concrete garages . . .

They prepared positions superbly. South of the position was a low ground protecting from artillery. It was connected to communication pathways. At the ends of the streets leading north through the village were concrete pillboxes. In the village quarters 'fire bags' were organised beforehand - those were cleared crossfire sectors with machine gun points in basements and prepared sniper positions. And in those 'fire bags' were carefully laid pathways with smashed through sheds and fences. Fighters attempting reconnaissance by force go through yards so as to avoid going through streets that are shot-through. They don't know who made these pathways - possibly our own. And through these pathways they came under cross-fire of machine guns and snipers. Groups perished without even realising they were being shot at.

. . .A group entered one of those 'bags'. Immediately nine 200's. The commander was without a scratch. He came back, took more people, and went to pick up the 200's the same path. Had three more killed. And so - for a week. In the end, there were twenty 200's that couldn't be picked up for several weeks. An order to 'pull out 200's' became equivalent to 'go and die!

By mid-April, from the 'pre-war' personnel of our company only a couple people remained. Now they were sending volunteers and reservists into combat. Most volunteers had the experience of 2014-2015, but this was a totally different war and their experience wasn't helping with anything. And reservists - those were miners caught on the streets without any experience. No one cared. Grab the machine gun and go, under mortar fire. There was a catastrophic shortage of people, fighters weren't withdrawn from the frontline for a month and more. Many were losing their shit from the overload. Some started drinking heavily, thankfully there was no shortage of booze at the frontline. With pure mathematics, the chances of leaving the frontline alive and not wounded were close to zero. The longer you stay there, the fewer chances you have left. From those who I was friends or shared bread with, in two weeks eight people died. Others wounded or concussed. In a week, three company commanders changed - two perished. No officers of company-squad level were left at all.

In mid-April, after numerous attacks and big losses, the garages were finally captured. After a day, from the low ground came a Ukrainian tank and simply destroyed the garages to the ground. Ukrainian tanks work there completely unpunished. This 9-storey house neighbouring us, two Ukrainian tanks were taking apart for several hours - calmly and methodically. Where was our artillery looking at the time - f*ck knows.

But let's put this in the context of typical analysis by just about everyone of a "static" front in eastern Ukraine, for instance in this major think piece at the Red State blog:

The initial concept that appeared to be developing a double envelopment from the salients to the north and south is not [sic] more. Instead, the Russians have been making slow, methodical progress and seem to be limiting their attacks based on available supplies. The Ukrainians are giving ground grudgingly.

The account above from the Russian point of view is entirely different. Russian commanders are being enticed into what they think will be easy gains in Ukrainian-held villages, only to find their units horribly chewed up in pre-prepared kill "bags", with each perceived gain simply leading them into new traps. The Daily Kos assessment is also without insight:

Turns out, no one is making big sweeping gains. It’s all “lay down artillery until defenders get the f’ out, walk in. Leave when their artillery returns fire.” Rinse, lather, repeat.

I don't see this. The result oif Ukraine's strategy throughout the war so far has been to exhaust the Russian army as it makes ineffective punches without progress toward its objectives -- in short, rope-a-dope. The effectiveness of the strategy can be gauged, first, by the Russian withdrawal from the Kyiv axis, and now by the Russian appointment of its senior general, Valery Gerasimov, to take over command of the Donbas region from Southern Military District Commander Alexander Dvornikov, who had failed to achieve his expected objectives after only a short time in command as the enormous Russian losses continue.

And one thing the Ukrainians are really good at is wiping out generals when they visit the front lines. I think the Russians are much closer to a loss than the conventional wisdom thinks.