Who Remembers The 40-Mile Convoy?

I'm not a military analyst, but I watch the coverage of the Russo-Ukraine War. and I'm starting to see a pattern to it that I've seen since the start: the 40-Mile Convoy Syndrome. What I think is the current (and correct) military view is this one from the AP and Pentagon spokesman John Kirby:

A sidelight of the battle for Kyiv was the widely reported saga of a Russian resupply convoy that stretched dozens of miles along a main roadway toward the capital. It initially seemed to be a worrisome sign for the Ukrainians, but they managed to attack elements of the convoy, which had limited off-road capability and thus eventually dispersed or otherwise became a non-factor in the fight.

“They never really provided a resupply of any value to Russian forces that were assembling around Kyiv, never really came to their aid,” said Pentagon spokesman John Kirby. “The Ukrainians put a stop to that convoy pretty quickly by being very nimble, knocking out bridges, hitting lead vehicles and stopping their movement.”

However, this was not the consensus as of early last month. A March 3 report in The National Interest had this take, including remarks from the same John Kirby:

Reports emerged earlier this week of a massive Russian military convoy—made up of main battle tanks (MBT’s), towed artillery units, and other armored vehicles—heading for Kiev. However, the Russian convoy has reportedly stalled in recent days. "They haven't … from our best estimates have not made any appreciable progress geographically speaking in the last 24 to 36 hours, and again nothing very significant. It is difficult for us to know with great specificity all that is going into this stall if you will," said Pentagon press secretary John Kirby on Wednesday.

Kirby offered several potential reasons to explain the apparent delay. “One, we believe the Russians are deliberately, actually, regrouping themselves and reassessing the progress that they have not made and how to make up for lost time. Two, we do believe that they have experienced logistics and sustainment challenges, challenges that we don't believe they fully anticipated. And three, they are getting resistance from the Ukrainians. We have some indications—nothing that we can 100 percent independently verify, but we have some indications that the Ukrainians have in fact tried to slow down that convoy. And we have no reason to doubt those reports, but again we can't speak to it in great specificity,” Kirby said.

Though Ukrainian units have allegedly chipped away at the convoy from the front and rear, Kiev simply does not have the capability to destroy or meaningfully degrade a force of this size.

Except that in hindsight, Kyiv did in fact have the capability to "destroy or meaningfully degrade" that same convoy, which Kirby himself confirmed a month later, "by being very nimble, knocking out bridges, hitting lead vehicles and stopping their movement".

The pattern of analysis I've begun to see throughout the war follows this model: the Russians fail to do what is predicted, e.g. to encircle Kyiv in a quick move. Various explanations are offered, all of which put forward reasons other than Ukrainian battlefield skill: mud, corruption, low morale -- or indeed, the Russians are just regrouping, in fact, it isn't a delay, it's just a strategic pause. Versions of this were being offered, even by military veterans and retired generals, up to the middle of last week: there were limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Irpin, but the 40-mile convoy hadn't weighed in yet!

I've actually come to the view that the current conventional wisdom is just a variant of last month's 40-mile convoy theory: the Russisn advance has had inexplicable setbacks and delays, but they're going to reposition and resupply and move to a new objective. Any day now. Just you wait! Thus the current line from the Institute for the Study of War, as of this morning:

Russian forces continued to reposition to continue their invasion in eastern and southern Ukraine, having abandoned the attack on Kyiv. They have largely completed their withdrawal from the Kyiv area and are reportedly redeploying some of the withdrawn combat forces from Belarus to Russia. . . . Russia has not yet committed forces withdrawn from the Battle of Kyiv back into the fighting in eastern Ukraine. . . . Belgorod continues to emerge as the primary concentration area for Russian forces regrouping and refitting after their retreat from Kyiv and in preparation for onward movement to their home stations or to join the fighting in the east

The subtext here couldn't be clearer: the words "reposition", "redeploying", "regrouping", and "refitting" all appear, in "preparation for onward movement" -- just like all the tanks and guns and trucks and stuff in the 40-mile convoy. The problem is the conflict between the consensus assumptions and other reporting, for instance in the London Times:

Russian units are suffering losses as high as 40 per cent and recruits in St Petersburg are being fast-tracked through training to prepare them for the front line, according to Ukrainian intelligence.

After six weeks of heavy fighting the Kremlin is rotating its forces out of Ukraine as it concentrates on more limited objectives including the encirclement of Donbas.

Some Russian units returning to their bases across the border are suffering from heavy losses, according to the Ukrainian defence ministry.

The difficulty is that the current conventional wisdom is that somehow the Russians are going to pull this out. Gen Milley said yesterday:

"I do think this is a very protracted conflict, and I think it's measured in years. I don't know about decade, but at least years for sure," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley told the House Armed Services Committee Tuesday during testimony on the defense budget.

"This is a very extended conflict that Russia has initiated and I think that NATO, the United States, Ukraine and all of the allies and partners supporting Ukraine will be involved in this for quite some time," Milley said.

The problem is the pattern we've been seeing is Russia has an unexpected delay, and indeed an unexpected rout, followed by a period of inactivity that's interpreted as a strategic pause -- followed by another rout. When units lose 30-40% of their strength, they don't just regroup. It seems to me that it may take months for the Russo-Ukraine War to resolve, but it isn't going to take years. So far, nobody seems to be making serious plans for a rapid Russian collapse as a power player with an equally rapid rise of Eastern Europe as a geopolitical force.

That is, nobody but Zelensky.