Out Of Momentum

Over the past few days, a consensus has begun to emerge that the Russian attempt to encircle the Ukrainian army in Donbas has stalled. For whatever reason, nobody is using the Clausewitzian term they'd been using around Kyiv, "culimination", but it seems pretty clear from the discussion that Clausewitz would say the Russian attack has culminated without reaching its objective. For instance, the BBC reports,

Russian forces are not making "the sort of strategic breakthrough" they have been looking for in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region, Justin Bronk - a research fellow from UK security think tank Rusi - tells BBC Radio 4's Today programme.

He says Russia continues to gain a few kilometres in some areas but their forces are taking "very heavy losses" and "may be out of momentum".

The 1945 site, which I'd linked just the other day for its pessimistic appraisal of Ukraine's chances in Donbas, has changed its tune:

When Russia redeployed tens of thousands of armored troops from the environs north of Kyiv and Sumy last month to the northern shoulder of the Donbas front, there was concern that the added manpower would produce an armored breakthrough of Ukraine’s lines. However, after almost three weeks of fighting, the Ukrainian troops have held the line.

Russia’s failure to affect [sic] a breakthrough represents a noteworthy accomplishment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). Whether that initial success can carry Ukraine to an ultimate victory will depend on how several key factors play out in the coming weeks and months.

. . . Russian military authorities likely expected to achieve a breakthrough in the northern shoulder of Ukraine’s defenses in the Donbas by this point – and failed. The reason is that Ukrainian troops continue to exceed expectations on the ground and Russian troops underperform (from inadequate/poor tactical pre-war training). In practical terms, however, the UAF’s successful defense results from the elaborate defenses Kyiv had ordered in the years since 2014.

The defenses in the Donbas include concrete bunkers, mutually-reinforcing positions, interlocking fields of fire, anti-tank mines, and pre-sited artillery targets on likely Russian avenues of approach. These defensive works and schemes have inflicted significant harm to attacking Russian troops and have been primarily responsible for preventing any penetrations thus far.

By far the best observer of the Ukraine war is Col Markus Reisner, who holds a PhD and is on the faculty of the Austrian military academy. I've linked another of his YouTube presentations here already. This one is on the current, Donbas phase of the war. My German is pretty good, but his is fast and technical, and I had to rely on both German and English subtitles to keep up with his full meaning.

A full English translation is available here, although it doesn't really carry the clarity of the German version. A few highlights:

The decisive phase then began just about mid-April and that was the attempt by the Russian side to encircle Ukraine's forces along the line of contact. There were two options: An encirclement in depth, following the Dnieper, or a short encirclement. In the last few days we have been seeing this short encirclement, where they are trying to encircle these Ukrainian forces with a northern pincer grip and force deployment and a southern pincer as well as force deployment.

Now, at the beginning of May, this Russian attack is obviously not taking the course that was expected. . . . The first factor is the terrain itself. . . . Looking at the terrain, we can see that, firstly, the Ukrainian side has set itself up in several defense lines staggered in depth. . . . The next terrain factor that limits the Russian side concerns vegetation and terrain structure. You can see it very well here: it took the Russians a while to be able to move out of this area, which is forested and also has a river flowing through it, in order to then develop the northern pincer grip [.]

As a second factor, let's now look at the forces and compare them. . If we look at the situation in the possible encirclement, we see a ratio of 48 to 68 battalions. This means that the ratio the attacker needs - namely 1:4 - is not met by the Russian side. This is because on closer examination one finds that the forces are roughly equal and the Ukrainian side also has the advantage that its forces are massively entrenched.

Another factor is time. In order to be able to develop an operation quickly and purposefully, it is quite crucial to act quickly. It was here where the problem of the Russians was, if you think back to the terrain: that they needed time at the beginning to be able to move out of the difficult terrain, to get ready for the attack, which was planned to take place southwards. . . . The first attack by the Russians was repelled. So it took some time before the Russian side was able to conduct an envelopment through this forested area, which is actually not suitable for the deployment of mechanised forces[.]

Let's recall that the retired US general talking heads kept insisting weeks ago that the terrain in Donbas was not like around Kyiv, it was instead open country, like Kansas, good for tanks and maneuver! But just looking at the YouTube videos of Ukrainian ambushes in Donbas made it plain this wasn't the case. Col Reisner continues,

The next factor that is decisive is information. The Russian side is constantly trying to create a common operational picture regarding the deployment of the Ukrainian forces. UAVs, in particular, are being used for this purpose. Time and again, the Ukrainian forces manage to shoot down these UAVs, such as the "Orlan-10" system, which makes it difficult for the Russians to actually create a common operational picture and, above all, to use their own combat support - i.e. artillery - effectively. . . . Only after . . . preparatory artillery fire they try to advance slowly with mechanised forces, supported by infantry. Of course, this brings the challenge that the surviving Ukrainian forces can attack the Russians again and again with anti-tank weapons.

Finally, he explains the actual historical parallel with the Battle of Kursk, which unintentionally refutes the retired US generals in their assessment that the terrain and the tactical situaiton benefited the Russians:

. . . . After this description of the situation, I would like to take a brief look at the past and try to use a historical example to draw conclusions about how this situation may develop in the coming days and weeks. The fact is that in the same area in 1943 there was already a battle of encirclement, namely the famous Battle of Kursk - the German "Citadel" operation that took place north of Kharkiv. Here, the Soviet side held a bulge towards the west and the German side tried to encircle the Soviet forces in a pincer movement from the north and from the south.

The situation today is very similar: south of Kharkiv we also have a bulge, this time formed by the Ukrainian side, towards the east and the Russian side is trying to encircle the Ukrainian forces in two pincer movements from the north and from the south. If we look at the outcome of the Battle of Kursk in 1943, historians agree that there were essentially three factors that decided this battle for the Soviet side. The first factor was that the Soviet side knew exactly where and at what time the German attacks would take place – due to the decoding of a German cipher machine of the type "Enigma", it is assumed.

The second factor was that the Soviet side prepared very precisely for this attack for months and set up defensive positions in the depth, especially along the flanks, to defend against the German attack. The third factor was the doggedness of the Soviet soldiers in fighting and defending against these German attacks, and in the end the German side had to stop both of these pincer movements and the Soviet side was able to decide the battle in its favour.

If we transpose this situation to the Donbass, we see that these three factors also apply here. The first factor is that the Ukrainian side obviously knows very much about the methods of the Russian attacks. The second factor is that the Ukrainian side has been preparing for years and has set up defence positions in the depth in anticipation of a Russian attack. The third factor is undoubtedly the doggedness of the Ukrainian soldiers who are defending virtually every metre of ground with the intention to attrit the Russian side so that this attack will finally fail and does not bring the success expected by the Russian side.

It's gonna be like Kursk. Right. Everyhone forgets that the outcome of Kursk was that the Germans failed to break through the Russian salient.

Finally, the Institute for the Study of War is also changing its assessments. In yesterday's report, it concludes,

Ukrainian forces captured several settlements north and east of Kharkiv in the last 24 hours, reducing the ability of Russian forces to threaten Ukraine’s second-largest city. This Ukrainian operation is developing into a successful, broader counteroffensive—as opposed to the more localized counterattacks that Ukrainian forces have conducted throughout the war to secure key terrain and disrupt Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are notably retaking territory along a broad arc around Kharkiv rather than focusing on a narrow thrust, indicating an ability to launch larger-scale offensive operations than we have observed so far in the war (as Ukrainian forces predominantly retook the outskirts of Kyiv following Russian withdrawals rather than in a major counteroffensive).

The Ukrainians are consistently outperforming expectations, but in large part, that's because expectations have been unrealistically low. s