That's Not A Bug, It's A Feature!
It's hard to tell if the latest reports on Mojtaba Khamenei were dug up after diligent search by US and Israeli intelligence, or if they were deliberately planted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard -- the cumulative effect is the same. As of this morning, for instance,
President Trump was stunned to learn last week that US intelligence indicates new Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei may be gay — and that his father, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, feared his suitability to rule the Islamic Republic for that reason, The Post can reveal.
Trump couldn’t contain his surprise and laughed aloud when he was briefed on the intel, according to sources.
So OK, Mojtaba's gay, but he's in a coma, so it doesn't matter -- and who benefits from this state of affairs? The Revolutionary Guard, who reportedly pressured the Assembly of Experts to name him Supreme Leader on his father's death. They wanted a non-entity in that role from the start. And in another wrinkle over the weekend,
Several international reports now claim that Mojtaba Khamenei may have been secretly transported to Russia for medical treatment after sustaining injuries during early strikes in the conflict. According to these claims, he could be recovering at a private medical facility connected to one of Vladimir Putin’s residences.
However, neither Iranian nor Russian officials have confirmed these reports, leaving the situation surrounded by uncertainty and speculation.
Or he could be just plain dead.
With speculation rife, even Donald Trump is unsure if Mojtaba Khamenei is dead or alive.
“I don’t know if he’s even alive. So far, nobody’s been able to show him,” he told NBC.
Gay, in a coma in Iran, in a coma in Russia, or dead -- it's all the same, he's a cipher, a Great Pumpkin in the constitutinal scheme. If he's gay, he'll be out if he ever wakes up. If he's in Russia, it means he's alive, but he's beyond anyone's ability to take him out with bunker busters, while it's also convenient to have him effectively in exile, and he'll likely stay there. If he's dead, the Revolutionary Guard seems in no hurry to replace him.However, although the usual blatherers explain Iran's constitution as a limited theocracy (or something like that), what they say bears no resemblance to reality. Here's how it's supposed to be:
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the position and office of supreme leader was created by the Iranian Constitution. It is based on the concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist, or “Velayat-e Faqih.”
. . . According to articles 57 and 110 of the constitution, the supreme leader sets domestic and foreign policy and supervises all branches of the government, including the executive, legislature and judiciary. Through the Guardian Council, he has the power to vet electoral candidates and veto parliamentary laws.
. . . While the supreme leader is the head of state, the president is the head of the government. After the supreme leader, the president is the second-in-command of the executive branch. As such, he answers to the supreme leader and executes his decrees.
. . . In 1979, the Assembly of Experts of Leadership, or Majles-e Khobregan-e Rahbari, was created in the new constitution and held its first election the same year. Article 111 of the constitution authorizes the assembly to appoint, supervise and, if necessary, remove the supreme leader.
. . . In essence, the supreme leader approves the candidates who are potentially elected to a body that oversees him. For this reason, as observers point out, the assembly has not been known to seriously supervise or overtly challenge him.
Except that reports from inside Iran indicate that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard told the Assembly of Experts to elect Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Khamenei's gay and bumbling son who may be dead, Iran's new Supreme Leader. But as with everything else, Article 110 of Iran's constitution puts the Supreme Leader over the Revolitionary Guard. How does the Revolutionary Guard get to elect the Supreme Leader? I asked my AI oracle just that. It answered,
As of March 16, 2026, reports indicate that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) secured Mojtaba Khamenei's appointment as Supreme Leader through a combination of intense political pressure, physical threats, and strategic manipulation of the Assembly of Experts' emergency sessions following the assassination of Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026.
. . . The IRGC Intelligence Organization allegedly threatened Assembly members and their families to ensure a vote for Mojtaba.
. . . Commanders applied "heavy pressure" through constant phone calls and in-person meetings leading up to the vote.
The IRGC insisted on a rapid decision, arguing that the wartime situation required immediate leadership.
Opponents were given limited time to present arguments, and some sessions were conducted online or in undisclosed locations to minimize dissent and outside interference.
So the IRGC, arguing that the wartime situation required immediate leadership, pushed through the election of a bumbling gay guy whom they already knew was in a coma. This might be desgnated a coup, but my guess is that it was already the case that the former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was kept in power by the IRGC, which had been the de facto power running the state pretty much from the start.Edward Feser argues that Trump's attack on Iran doesn't fit "just war doctrine" because it hasn't been undertaken by the proper constitutional authority (although he neglects to mention that the War Powers Resolution of 1973 gives Trump precisely the authorization he is using to conduct this operation). But if he insists that Trump observe all the constitutional niceties -- which in fact he is -- then what of the IRGC, which has put in place a puppet Supreme Leader who may even be unaware that his country is at war, when he would be expected to make national policy under Iran's constitution?
This goes to the basic quesiton of how a state can negotiate with a state that doesn't gtve its negotiators the power to negotiate in any practical way, because the source of state authority is so unclear.
It's worth recognizing that the victories over both Germany and Japan in World War II could be effected only when Hitler's suicide gave his designated successor, Dönitz, the clear state authority to order surrender. In Japan, the use of the second nuclear bomb in particular forced a cabinet deadlock in which the emperor finally had to assert his authority to order surreneder, and this was effective only after an attempted coup to remove him.
This suggests that some equivalent crisis of state authority in Iran will be needed to end the current war. It will likely involve a removal of the IRGC from de facto control of the state.




