Why The UK Decline?
A recent piece at the Atlantic, How Britain Became as Poor as Mississippi, asks, "Who broke Britain?" but it asserts that this somehow took place over just the past 18 years, specifically since the 2008 financial crisis:
In 2007, before the global financial crisis, Britain was at its postimperial zenith. Median household income had just surpassed that of Germany. A pound was worth more than $2, and London was arguably displacing New York as the center of international banking.
This is a remarkably short-sighted view. In 1982, the UK was, at enormous trouble and expense, and only with covert US help, able to reconquer the Falkland Islands with a naval task force. But even in 2008, this would have been unlikely; the three aircraft carriers that had played a key role in 1982 were in the process of being decommissioned, with no replacements planned. But the UK's decline had been in progress well before then. The inspiring utterances of two Royal Navy admirals give a hint:In 1805, before the Battle of Trafalgar, Lord Nelson said, "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy." In 1916, during the Battle of Jutland, Admiral David Beatty said, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today", after two of his battlecruisers catastrophically exploded; German gunnery had vastly exceeded expectations. The same defects in design led to the loss of the HMS Hood at the hands of the Bismarck in 1941.
Winston Churchill is vastly overrated as a political figure; he was the primary architect and most vocal champion of the 1915 Dardanelles campaign. As Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to 1929, he returned the pound to the pre-1914 gold standard, which increased the value of UK exports and drove down demand for coal, which in turn forced miners' wages down and led to the General Strike of 1926, which as I've noted here had the effect of worsening conditions for the working class while increasing bourgeois self-delusion.
The US Federal Reserve supported the return to the gold standard and kept US interest rates low, which led to the speculative bubble that culminated in the crash of 1929. The 1929 crash hit Germany especially hard:
The new Weimar Republic had weathered a period of intense inflation in the 1920s due to reparations required by the Versailles Treaty. Rather than tax German citizens to pay the reparations, Germany borrowed millions of dollars from the United States and went further into debt. American demands for loan repayment had disastrous repercussions for an already fragile German economy, with banks failing and unemployment rising.
. . . While the Great Depression (and German economic conditions in general) were not solely responsible for bringing Hitler to power, they helped create an environment in which he gained support.
In other words, Hitler and the European Theater of the Second World War were in some measure the product of UK policy missteps since the 1920s. Luckily, by 1943, the US had arrived in the UK with enough influence to see that, via Roosevelt and Eisenhower, Churchill was largely sidelined.
Twice, at Churchill’s behest, the British had lobbied to postpone the invasion of France and instead pursue operations in the Mediterranean, initially in favour of Operation Torch (1942), then for the invasion of Sicily in 1943. Although there were sound military reasons behind both deferrals, American suspicions had grown by the time of Washington DC-based ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943 that the British prime minister was opposed to a cross-Channel invasion, period. . . . But the consistency of his own utterances – in favour of operations in the Balkans, bringing Turkey into the war, and a projected assault on Norway, Operation Jupiter – were instrumental in the Americans concluding that the British had lost faith in the cross-Channel option. This was also the view of the Soviets, for whom the only worthwhile second front was a major invasion of German-held France.
The idea of the UK as some sort of cultural bastion has always been largely unquestioned hype. The writer at the Atlantic piece blames post-2008 decline on budget austerity and Brexit:
The welfare state had partially compensated the losers from globalization. When it abruptly shrank—because the masters of the universe had miscalculated—anger erupted upward, at British elites, and also outward, at European migrants, who were competing for jobs and public services. It was because of this political pressure that Cameron made another fateful decision: to hold the Brexit referendum in 2016. . . . He did not want to leave the European Union, but he wanted to arrest the rise of figures such as Nigel Farage, the longtime gadfly of British politics. . . . Left-behind Britain, the places especially harmed by austerity cuts, voted overwhelmingly to leave. The morning after he lost the referendum, Cameron resigned, ushering in a period of political instability that has now lasted a decade, and shows no sign of ending.
The mention of migrants here is one of relatively few, and this only in the context of "European" ones. This passage below, on the other hand, gives more context to the real problem:
The most detailed plans released by Reform involve immigration—the one issue that evokes as much anger among voters as living standards do. The Conservatives broke their pledges: Johnson promised to reduce the net inflow of migrants, but his policies, meant to bolster health-care staffing and stabilize falling university enrollment, led to the legal arrival of more than 3 million non-EU immigrants, who now amount to one out of every 25 people in Britain. Later, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak struggled to deal with the arrival of more than 150,000 migrants who’d crossed the English Channel on small boats.
This is just the most recent reappearance of the same mistake: in this post in March, I noted that the first measures to import non-European migrants to the UK took place after World war II in response to "labor shortages" in the health care industry -- except that "labor shortages" are just another way of saying that wages in the industry were rising, and this was simply a government-sposnored effort to keep wages low by importing workers willing to work for low wages.But a byproduct of the low-wage migrant worker policy is this odd phenomenon of stabbings and rapings by migrants, or the UK-born children of migrants in persistent old-country ethnic communities, primarily against members of the UK working class, who apparently are closest at hand. And it's the Labour government, the creature of the UK Fabian socialist movement founded theoretically to promote the interests of the working class, that's enabling the continuing phenomenon.
And it's Elon Musk, the wealthy US industrialist, who's taken the role of thorn in Labour's side by using his US-based social media platform to call out Labour's failings. The story goes that Musk's predecessor Henry Ford understood that if he paid his workers well enough that they could buy his cars, he'd make a lot more money. Others argue that he doubled their wages not to make them prosperous, but to avoid turnover, although that would just be a sign that whatever the reason, it's good policy to treat the workers well.
Somehow, the Atlantic writer seems to have lost sight of the idea that if your policy is to drive wages down, you'll wind up like Mississippi. But as far as I can tell, as a naive American looking at the UK from thousands of miles away, it's hard not to think this policy has been in place long before the 21st century, and members of the highly prestigious intellectual bourgeoisie have promoted it for 150 years. It's time to rethink the UK.






