Biden At The UN

I'm convinced there's a latter-day George F Kennan now at the State Department who, like the one who wrote the Long Telegram, has the ear of some contemproary Averell Harriman, who in turn can tell important people what to do. Consider that the one area in which President Brandon has effectively recused himself in recent months has been Ukraine. Either Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin, or Gen Milley articulates US Ukraine policy and says (or carefully omits to say) what weapons we are sending there. Early in the game, it seems the big guy contradicted Secretary Blinken on whether Ukraine would get third-party surplus Migs, but somehow the Migs happened anyhow, while the big guy effectively stopped talking about Ukraine. At all.

Biden's tendency to ramble and interfere has been fairly well documented, for instance:

The veteran Senator, as Obama saw it, had a tendency to “ramble, clearly loving every minute of it".

The would-be President is said to have confided in his advisor David Axelrod: “Joe Biden is a decent guy but man, that guy can just talk and talk. It's an incredible thing to see.”

In Condoleezza Rice’s confirmation hearing during George W.Bush’s presidency, Obama is alleged to have passed a staffer a note saying: 'Shoot. Me. Now,' as Biden addressed the hearing.

The book also claims, “The biggest insult to Biden was how little his input mattered to Obama's inner circle.

This tendency to go off script and run his mouth was displayed just this past weekend, when he variously declared in an interview that COVID was over, contradicting Dr Fauci, announced US troops would defend Taiwan, against established State Department policy, and gave a muddled and unconvincing reply to Putin's nuclear threats that discomfited the generals. Yet, since the business of the Migs, he's stayed out of Ukraine, pretty much except for yesterday, when he addressed the UN. But there was nothing freelance or prolix about that.

His address to the General Assembly was not, shall we say, vintage Joe Biden. He simply does not normally talk this way.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, my fellow leaders, in the last year, our world has experienced great upheaval: a growing crisis in food insecurity; record heat, floods, and droughts; COVID-19; inflation; and a brutal, needless war — a war chosen by one man, to be very blunt.

Let us speak plainly. A permanent member of the United Nations Security Council invaded its neighbor, attempted to erase a sovereign state from the map.

Russia has shamelessly violated the core tenets of the United Nations Charter — no more important than the clear prohibition against countries taking the territory of their neighbor by force.

Elevated diction. Parallel structure. Stately rhythm. Four-syllable words. And minimal stuttering and stumbling. This wasn't written by his normal handlers. It presumably came from the mandarins at State whose predecessors wrote the same material for John F Kennedy. Somebody not only got it written, but somebody else was able to tell the big guy to shut up, sit down, read this through more than once before you deliver it, and follow the teleprompter. You want to ramble and interfere? Tough. Do it the way we tell you.

And he did. It wasn't perfect, but the garbling and misspeaking were much more under control than usual. And I can only contrast this with his behavior only hours after the address:

Joe Biden spoke to the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, but the most disturbing part of his day happened afterward. The president took that stage at an event sponsored by The Global Fund, which does work regarding AIDS and other diseases, and things went off the rails. In this case, quite literally.

A video is circulating showing Biden appearing to be completely dazed and confused, fumbling around the stage as his handlers attempt to talk him down. Meanwhile, another man is speaking, trying to thank him for being there while the president appears to have no idea what’s happening.

Here's a version of the video:

There was nothing particularly new about this episode; he's become well known for wandering around the stage and shaking hands with people who aren't there. What's intriguing is that it came so soon after his performance at the General Assembly, where this sort of thing in fact did not happen. What was the difference? Donald Trump has suggested in the past that he gets some sort of shot before debates and other such events that keeps him alert and on the ball for some period of time. If so, it may have worn off by the time he spoke at the Global Fund. On the other hand, we have no direct evidence of anything like this.

But even if we stipulate that this is the explanation, we still have the question of who's able to make him get that shot, because he clearly doesn't get it before every appearance. Even if the shot is the explanation, someone decides when he absolutely has to take it. On the other hand, if there's no shot -- and so far, there's no real evidence there is one -- someone still seems able to sit him down, tell him to serious up, read this damn speech before you deliver it, and pay attention to the teleprompter. But Barack Obama himself was never able to do this, from informed accounts.

So, if it isn't Barack Obama, who is? And let's face it, our Ukraine policy has been about the wisest and best-executed of any, from any administration, probably since Reagan. Someone has been able to tell Biden to stay out of it and make that instruction stick. In that one area, no other.

Isn't that odd?

US Presidents And The N-Word

The N-word in this case is "narcissism". Last week I ran across this more or less typical piece of pop psychology:

Based on an analysis of the 19 presidents who served between 1897 and 2009 (from William McKinley to George W. Bush), the degree to which a commander in chief exhibited grandiose narcissistic personality traits is correlated with the duration of any wars they presided over.

. . . [Ohio State political scientist John P Harden] used data pulled from the Correlates of War database, which tracks conflicts involving at least 1,000 deaths in battle within a one-year period – so 11 operations for the US during the study period.

This was cross-referenced with previous research that analyzed the characters of US presidents, in part through their biographers. High levels of assertiveness and excitement-seeking, and low levels of modesty, compliance and straightforwardness were used to measure narcissistic tendencies.

US chiefs who scored lower on narcissism, including McKinley and Eisenhower, tended to put the interests of the state first. Wars were pursued only as a last resort, and were ended as quickly as possible – see Eisenhower's quick exit from the Korean War, for example.

Those presidents who ranked higher for narcissism, such as Roosevelt and Nixon, were less likely to separate personal and state interests, carrying on conflicts for longer. For example, Nixon inherited the Vietnam War, and continued it for another four years.

So I'm puzzled. McKinley, apparently thought not to be a narcissist, or at least not a big one, waged the Spanish-American War. Theodore Roosevelt, one of the most attention-seeking of US presidents, won the Nobel Peace Prize and pursued a foreign policy of mediating international disputes. No wars began during his administration. The same might be said of Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, even though Coolidge was a "highly visible president":

During his 67 months as President, he held 520 press conferences or an average of nearly eight each month, "bringing himself almost daily," wrote a reporter in 1927, "into the American home." He spoke on the radio at least monthly to national audiences. Coolidge also enjoyed having himself photographed. To the delight of cameramen, the President posed in old-fashioned overalls (when working on his father's farm), full Indian headdress (speaking to a crowd of ten thousand Sioux), and cowboy chaps and hat (on vacation in South Dakota). He was the first President to appear in a talking film--a recording of one of his speeches.

On the other hand, regarding his highly ambitious and self-satisfied successor,

Coolidge thought Hoover boastful and derided him as "Wonder Boy." "That man," he said, "has offered me unsolicited advice every day for six years, all of it bad."

Yet neither started a war. Franklin Roosevelt had the Second World War effectively forced on him and followed policies aimed at shortening the war, such as aiding the Soviet Union against Hitler. He appears to have followed Eisenhower's advice of avoiding unnecessarily expensive maneuvers to secure Berlin, leaving that to the Soviets. His successor Truman, as much a publicity seeker as any other president, accepted the atomic bomb as a means of hastening Japanese surrender.

What can anyone say about Nixon? He's as much a nebbish or a neurotic as a narcissist. This goes to the problem that "narcissist" has become a meaningless term. I've been culling my bookshelves for books that are long out of fashion and that I'll never read again, and I came across two by the once-popular psychiatrist M Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled and People of the Lie (out they went). Although Peck does use the term, he wrote before "narcissism" became the effective universal descriptor for nearly any personality trait.

In fact, just ten years ago, a young and ambitious "continuing Anglican" priest who had discovered Peck while in seminary (I can only think belatedly; People of the Lie was published in 1983) decided the problem with a more senior priest he wanted to edge out in the transition to the ordinariate was that the senior man was a person of the lie and denounced him in Peck's terms to all who would listen. It says something about the whole situation that he must not have understood the current expression should be "narcissist", not "person of the lie", and neither, apparently, did his listeners -- and it says something about the ordinariate that the older man was passed over in favor of the younger with those advanced ideas.

Getting rid of books I'll never open again is turning out to be a big job. So far, though, I haven't run into any books about narcissism.

The Pandemic Is Over!

As the saying goes, you don't have dementia if you forget your keys. You have dementia if you forget what your keys are for. President Brandon seems to have stepped all over not just his allies but his diplomatic advisers in Sunday's 60 Minutes interview , but I see no signs of dementia.

The reaction at the Daily Kos was predictable to his announcement that the pandemic is over: 'You’re counting votes.' We are 'counting bodies': Experts outraged at Biden deeming pandemic over. But nobody seems to dispute that he was aware of his surroundings, knew this was a television interview, and was more or less aware of the questions and giving answers that reflected the overall context.

The problem was that he basically hadn't done the prep. The public health establishment is at the very best deeply divided over what to do next with the pandemic; over the summer, it became clear that the public is fed up with vax and masks, and it quietly backed off on threats to reimpose indoor masking in LA County. On the other hand, the FDA has just authorized yet another set of COVID boosters, and the CDC is beginning the push for a new round of vax. From the redoubtable Dr Walensky:

“The updated COVID-19 boosters are formulated to better protect against the most recently circulating COVID-19 variant. They can help restore protection that has waned since previous vaccination and were designed to provide broader protection against newer variants. This recommendation followed a comprehensive scientific evaluation and robust scientific discussion. If you are eligible, there is no bad time to get your COVID-19 booster and I strongly encourage you to receive it.”

Think of the hit to Big Pharma's bottom line if COVID goes away! Nobody seems to have briefed the big guy about this, or if they did, he didn't listen, or he didn't think of it when it came up. He forgot the keys, but he didn't forget what the keys were for. The same applies to his remarks on Taiwan:

President Joe Biden in an interview that aired Sunday said US military personnel would defend Taiwan if the Chinese military were to launch an invasion of the democratically ruled island, in comments that yet again appear to venture beyond the longstanding US policy on the issue.

The comments on CBS’s “60 Minutes” reiterate a pledge to defend Taiwan that Biden has previously made, though Sunday he specified that “US men and women” would be involved in the effort.

In an interview, Biden was asked whether “US forces, US men and women, would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion,” a prospect US officials privately fear is becoming more likely.

“Yes,” Biden said.

It’s not the first time Biden has gone further in his public comments than the longstanding US approach of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to the defense of Taiwan. Most recently, during a visit to Tokyo in May, Biden said the US would intervene militarily if China attempts to take Taiwan by force.

The White House has been quick to downplay Biden’s previous comments on Taiwan, reiterating that US policy hasn’t changed, and on Sunday, “60 Minutes” reported receiving a similar response to Biden’s answers in their interview.

I would actually say that in both cases, Biden's remarks reflect sounder policy than the conventional wisdom with which he may have been briefed, and it's very likely in the interests of everyone but Beijing to have US policy on defending Taiwan a worrisome matter. And beyond any question, not only do we need to be done with COVID, but everything from the lab leak to the lockdowns needs to be thoroughly investigated to prevent it happening again, something on which Biden will never follow through.

None of the excitement, though, means there's any actual daylight between Biden and the public health or diplomaic elites. Biden isn't any sort of closet moderate. In a meeting with his handlers the next day, he'll be just as likely to insist the pandemic is raging on, and nobody with any sense would promise Taiwan will be defended with US troops. The problem is that Biden isn't much different from his vice president when it comes to reading his briefings, and when he gets out in public without his minders, he simply wings it. He's just unprepared. This applies as well to his warning to Putin about nukes:

", , , I wonder, Mr. President, what you would say to [Putin] if he is considering using chemical or tactical nuclear weapons."

"Don't. Don't. Don't. . . " Mr. Biden said.

"Don't. Don't. Don't," is what victims say just before they're shot. One of the talking-head retired generals, I forget which, remarked that it would have been much better if Biden had said nothing. But it was what it was.

I'm not sure if, on balance, Dubya was much smarter than Biden, but he was at least more diligent, he did his homework, and he listened to Dick Cheney, for whatever that was worth. Biden's problem is that he's dumb as a rock and lazy, and beyond that, he's entitled. He's all those, but none of them is a medical issue.

Trump On Putin

Yesterday, I noted that prior to the first weeks of the Russo-Ukraine War, there was an effective consensus that Russia was the second-strongest military power and a near peer to the US and NATO. Trump has had a fair amount of criticism for remarks earlier this year that have been interpreted as "praising Putin", but I think if we take them in context of prevailing world opinion, they don't strike me as unusual. This piece at CNN lists some of Trump's remarks on Putin from last spring:

At a campaign rally in Georgia [March 26], the former President, again, praised Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“The smartest one gets to the top,” Trump told the crowd. “That didn’t work so well recently in our country. But they ask me, ‘Is Putin smart?’ Yes, Putin was smart. And I actually thought he was going to be negotiating. I said, ‘That’s a hell of a way to negotiate, put 200,000 soldiers on the border.’”

Trump added that Putin made a “big mistake,” but that “it looked like a great negotiation.”

I find this hard to fault, given the assumptions pretty much everyone in public life had about Putin up to the failure of the February invasion. He had a powerful army. Ukraine had been in the news chiefly for Burisma and its $50,000 a month payments to Hunter Biden, which suggested the country was a hopelessly corrupt backwater in the Afghan league. Putin's demand on the face of it was simply that the West provide assurance that Ukraine would enter neither the EU nor NATO and continue to serve as a neutral buffer for Russia. Putin's stick would be that Russian tanks would roll into Kyiv, and any effort by the West to stop this would be an overextension.

Earlier in the war, this position was at least arguable. In May, Pope Francis said,

“NATO barking at Russia’s doors” may have raised alarms in the Kremlin about the Western European alliance’s intentions in Ukraine. “I can’t say if (Russia’s) anger was provoked,” he continued, “but facilitated, maybe yes.”

What permanently changed the consensus on Putin's intentions was the revelation of Russian atrocities in places like Bucha following its withdrawal from the Kyiv region in April, which showed that Putin didn't in practice want Ukraine to be a neutral buffer, but instead was willing to exterminate some large part of its population and pillage its modest wealth. Even Pope Francis's public statements have hardened toward Russia since that time. However, at the time of the invasion and its runup, nobody prominent in public life foresaw that outcome. In a February 22 interview, two days before the invasion on February 24, Trump said,

BUCK [SEXTON]: Mr. President, in the last 24 hours we know Russia has said that they are recognizing two breakaway regions of Ukraine, and now this White House is stating that this is an “invasion.” That’s a strong word. What went wrong here? What has the current occupant of the Oval Office done that he could have done differently?

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, what went wrong was a rigged election and what went wrong is a candidate that shouldn’t be there and a man that has no concept of what he’s doing. I went in yesterday and there was a television screen, and I said, “This is genius.” Putin declares a big portion of the Ukraine — of Ukraine. Putin declares it as independent. Oh, that’s wonderful. (sarcastic)

So, Putin is now saying, “It’s independent,” a large section of Ukraine. I said, “How smart is that?” And he’s gonna go in and be a peacekeeper. That’s strongest peace force… We could use that on our southern border. That’s the strongest peace force I’ve ever seen. There were more army tanks than I’ve ever seen. They’re gonna keep peace all right. No, but think of it. Here’s a guy who’s very savvy… I know him very well. Very, very well.

By the way, this never would have happened with us. Had I been in office, not even thinkable. This would never have happened. But here’s a guy that says, you know, “I’m gonna declare a big portion of Ukraine independent,” he used the word “independent,” “and we’re gonna go out and we’re gonna go in and we’re gonna help keep peace.” You gotta say that’s pretty savvy. And you know what the response was from Biden? There was no response. They didn’t have one for that. No, it’s very sad. Very sad.

Trump at that stage, before any tanks had actually rolled in, was relying on Putin's public statements as an indication of his strategy, and it's worth noting that if that was all that happened -- Putin entered disputed regions exclusively as a "peacekeeping" force -- the situation would have been far less clear and Putin's position at least more sustainable. And Trump's later remarks quoted above a month later, March 26, support this view: Putin made a “big mistake” in an all-out invasion, but in the days immediately prior, “it looked like a great negotiation.” Later in the February 22 interview, Trump said,

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Well, even “Sleepy Eyes” Chuck Todd said this weekend during his show — I was watching it for a change and he said — (summarized), “How come there’s been no invasion during the period of time that the Trump administration was there but they did invade — very severely invade — with Obama and then they waited and then they invaded?”

This would never have happened if we were there. But he did. Chuck Todd asked that question. How come there was none of this happening during the Trump administration? I knew Putin very well. I got along with him great. He liked me. I liked him. I mean, you know, he’s a tough cookie, got a lot of the great charm and a lot of pride. But the way he — and he loves his country, you know? He loves his country. He’s acting a little differently I think now.

This again is consistent with observations by other prominent figures like Condoleeza Rice that Putin has changed and is not the person they worked with. And Trump is saying this two days before the actual invasion, when the extent of Putin's miscalculation was completely unknown. Some of these remarks have been taken out of context, including by President Zelensky as recently as a week ago:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he was surprised by former President Trump’s continued praise of Russian President Vladimir Putin even after Moscow invaded Ukraine, given how much information Trump was privy to about the fellow world leader.

“I believe he had enough time, plenty of time, to understand who Putin is,” Zelensky told CNN’s Fareed Zakaria in an interview aired Sunday.

. . . “Ukraine in his eyes is too far away. But this war has no distances it could not cover, so I believe he needs to look at the situation without, as we say, pink glasses on,” Zelensky said, per CNN’s translation.

However, as of March 15, a little over two weeks after the invasion, Trump said,

“I’m surprised — I’m surprised. I thought he was negotiating when he sent his troops to the border. I thought he was negotiating,” Trump told the outlet in a phone interview. “I thought it was a tough way to negotiate but a smart way to negotiate.”

. . . “I figured he was going to make a good deal like everybody else does with the United States and the other people they tend to deal with — you know, like every trade deal. We’ve never made a good trade deal until I came along,” Trump said. “And then he went in — and I think he’s changed. I think he’s changed. It’s a very sad thing for the world. He’s very much changed.”

As far as I can tell, these remarks are the bulk of what Trump has said since the invasion. I would guess that Zelensky has been shown only what Trump said in the February 22 interview, and that's the basis for his comments this month. We'll have to see what else Trump may eventually have to say about Ukraine in light of more recent developments, but from what we currently have, once he became more fully aware of the actual circumstances, his position has been that Putin has changed and is not the negotiating genius he once thought.

The State Of Commentary On The War

The Austrian Col Markus Reisner is still highly regarded as a war analyst on reddit, but as I've noted, although he certainly looks the part, his recent commentary has been largely irrelevant, overtaken by events, and even disingenuous. On the other hand, the eponymous Kos at the left-wing Daily Kos has been consistently the most insightful and predictive throughout the war. Let's take an example. Here's last night's analysis from the Institute for the Study of War, which is actually a cut above their usual performance:

Russian forces continue to conduct meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut instead of focusing on defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives that continue to advance. Russian troops continue to attack Bakhmut and various villages near Donetsk City of emotional significance to pro-war residents of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) but little other importance. . . . The Russians cannot hope to make gains around Bakhmut or Donetsk City on a large enough scale to derail Ukrainian counteroffensives and appear to be continuing an almost robotic effort to gain ground in Donetsk Oblast that seems increasingly divorced from the overall realities of the theater.

There's some furrowing of the brow and stroking of the chin, but no real attempt to explain why. As of early this morning, Kos does a much better job with the same material:

It’s patently absurd that at the same time that Ukraine is notching gains in Kherson, Kharkiv, and northern Luhansk Oblasts, Russia is wasting time, men, and material pushing forward in a region that offers no strategic payoff.

Indeed, the original point of attacking this front was to form the southern claw of a pincer movement that would’ve trapped tens of thousands of entrenched Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. . . . This pincer plan was the reason Russia pushed hard into Izyum, at great logistical cost.

. . . Still, as long as they held Izyum, Russia could maintain the fiction that pushing hard in Donetsk oblast made some kind of military sense. But now that Izyum is liberated, what exactly is the military reason to continue this self-destructive behavior?

This in fact is the unmentioned elephant in the room of Col Reisner's latest YouTube commentary -- in his prior July presentation, he stressed the Russian pincer strategy and strongly implied its likelihood of success. But faced with the Russian withdrawal from Izyum, Col Reisner has simply dropped any further mention of the pincers. But let's return to Kos's question, why are the Russians continuing to attack at the southern claw of the pincer when the northern claw is no longer in play?

The reason is simple: Russia isn’t actually in charge in this corner of the front.

This is Wagner PMC (private military contractor) territory. Russian forces lack a unified command: there’s the Russian army (divided into sectors led by separate military districts), VDV (airborne)corps, Luhansk proxies, Donetsk proxies, Rosgvardia (Putin’s personal army, the national guard), the Chechen Kadyrovites, and Wagner mercenaries.

So we laughed at pro-Russian sources for celebrating the capture of that hill near Kodema while the entire northern front was collapsing. Yet they were genuinely celebrating in Wagner circles. . . . Wagner’s corporate leadership apparently decided that “we’re the only group in Russia making progress” was a much better business development slogan than “we’re all in this together.”

Kos concludes that Russian strategy is a [redacted]. This is certainly a better explanation -- or maybe I should say, simply an explanation, in the absence of any from Col Reisner or the ISW -- but why is this insight still so rare and hard to reach? I think it's still reasonable to ask why US and Western strategic analysis generally saw the Russian military as a near-peer to the US and NATO. Let's keep iin mind that before February, Trump was hardly unique in seeing Putin as a negotiating genius in threatening to invade Ukraine -- Trump thought it was a legitimate trade for Putin to offer the status quo in Ukraine in return for a Western agreement to keep Ukraine out of NATO and the EU.

That assessment in turn was based on the prewar consensus that a Russian invasion would see tanks in Kyiv in a matter of days. I believe that if you'd asked anyone, Trump, Biden, Obama, Boris Johnson, Merkel, Macron, whomever, you'd have had agreement on that outcome. Yet within weeks of the actual invasion, it emerged that a third-rate power could fight the putative near-peer to the US and NATO to a standstill with improvised hand-held weapons and cheap drones.

This in fact has been a lesson for the US in misapplied spending. So far, we've spent $15 billion in the Ukraine war that's likely to end permanently any assumption that Russia is our military near-peer. In comparison, the futile Afghanistan exercise cost over $2 trillion, nearly $300 million a day. It failed to defeat the Taliban and had little perceptible impact over and above the two Iraq wars in containing Islamism. My calculator says $300 million a day is about $110 billion a year. The money we've spent in Ukraine, and the money we're likely to spend, will be far more of a bargain.

On top of that, initial hesitation on matters like supplying Ukraine with secondhand Migs via third parties or giving them heavy artillery on the basis that such moves would provoke Putin and start World War III also proved misguided, as did assumptions that Ukraine's military was just as corrupt and incompetent as Russia's. What was the source of these miscalculations on our part?

That's the real question worth pursuing.

The Ivy League Hasn't Changed

Every couple of decades I seem to run into something that conveys the essence of the Ivy League as I experienced it as an undergraduate. My wife normally removes all communications from my alma mater from the incoming mail and quietly throws them out before I can see them, but around 20 years ago, she missed an invitation from a local alumni group to attend a lecture from one of the "superstar" (their word) professors who'd be visiting. I decided to attend. The lecture was so awful that I wound up getting involved in the ill-fated Dartmouth alumni trustee movement to see what I might do to change things. At least I didn't get a heart attack, and that's a different story anyhow, but it's an indicator of why my wife normally keeps that sort of thing away from me.

Just lately, Yale has been running a series of YouTube lectures on Ukraine by one of their own superstars, Timothy Snyder. There's a link to one of them at the top of this post. I watched it, because I somehow expected worthwhile insight on Ukraine, but the puzzling thing was that there was actually almost no useful information about Ukraine in it. (In contrast, Ukraine historian Rabbi Henry Abramson's YouTube channel has far better presentations on Ukraine history and the current war.)

But if you watch any of the Timothy Snyder YouTubes on Ukraine, several strange things pop out. The first, from the context of remarks and asides he makes throughout the lectures, is that this is apparently a first-semester course for first-year undergraduates, and that's a little off, because on one hand, I would have expected (if I were a first-semester, first-year undergraduate) to be hearing insights into the current conflict based on the concrete experience of someone who's been there and been involved. Not a bit of it; if you want that, go watch Rabbi Abramson.

Instead, Prof Synder's lectures are peppered with digressions and asides that are clearly intended just to flatter the audience, who are, after all, impressionable kids who've just arrived on campus -- and beyond that, they've already been primed with the expectation that they've been selected in a rigorous, merit-based process that's filtered each one of them out as the crème de la crème -- they've been effectively told this in their acceptance letters. Snyder's lectures in fact contain a running joke that in effect,"You've been waiting to learn what special things you learn in a Yale class -- well, here it is. It's complicated!"

And on one hand, this is the great post-modern insight. What is a nation? Who knows? Philosophers just keep asking. How does a nation form? Who knows? It's complicated! And anyone who thinks he knows the answer is probably a Trumpist, which is what we definitely are not here. But then he switches to a sort of quasi-Hegelian formulation that there is in fact a universal three-phase national myth, a golden time of the founding, followed by a time when the founding principles were corrupted, which leads us to the present, when we are called to return to the principles of the founding.

Somehow, Ivy undergraduates are always expected to draw quasi-Hegelian conclusions, or maybe to have quasi-Hegelian conclusions drawn for them.

Snyder feels that Putinism represents this quasi-Hegelian national myth for Russia, which calls them to purify the Rus by invading Ukraine. But Trump also promotes this myth for the US in the form of MAGA, which is as destructive as Putinism. QED or something. What on earth does this have to do with the Ukraine war? And does this three-phase myth apply to Ukraine itself? If so, how? If not, why not? Well, apparently it's complicated, because Snyder won't go into it.

Oddly, Snyder encourages the class to interrupt him with questions, but nobody does. I think the answer is he's showing them how to be good Ivy Leaguers, and they aren't going to dispute it; they're there to drink the Kool-Aid, after all. If I had been in the class, though, here's the question I'd ask: "Physicists can differ on whether quantum physics or particle physics explains the world, but neither one affects how we drive a car. You can say everything's complicated, and there's a three-phase national myth, but how does that affect how we make policy? Is there any way we can come out of this class with a clearer idea of what we should be doing in Ukraine?"

My experience as an Ivy undergraduate, as well as an adult who's been through a graduate program and later occasionally interacted with Ivy League professors, is that the professor will become upset with that sort of question, dismiss it or trivialize it with a joke, and refuse to engage further. The subject of the lecture is not what might be the best Ukraine policy, the subject of the lecture is how to be an Ivy Leaguer.

I've remarked here now and then that a few weeks into my first semester at Dartmouth, I went to the dean of freshmen first-year and told him I thought there'd been a terrible mistake. He convinced me to stick it through, but I never thought I was wrong. And if you want to learn about Ukraine, listen to Rabbi Abramson, not Prof Snyder.

Solzhenitsyn And Orthodoxy

I discovered a wide-ranging, multipart esasay by Peter Brooke, Solzhenitsyn in the USA, which can be found on the web but was first published in Church and State No.122, Oct-Dec 2015. His treatment of the subject is multidimensional and something I hadn't previously encountered, but it answers a lot of questions that had been in the back of my mind.

I've read a lot of Solzhenitsyn, including all of The Gulag Archipelago, much of it at least twice. It came out in English in the mid-1970s, subtitled "an experiment in literary investigation", not long after I discovered Milton's prose, to which I think it bears a close if unintentional relation. Solzhenitsyn and Milton were deeply religious men, if highly idiosyncratic in their views, who bent literary genre to their highly idiosyncratic purposes. As a writer, I fell under the influence of both.

Now in the context of the Russo-Ukraine War, there seems to be an emerging if so far inchoate movement to reevaluate Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn as Russian Orthodox writers whose views on Orthodoxy can't encompass or explain a Russian invasion of Ukraine that in its near-genocidal brutality has drawn comparison to the German invasion of 1941, yet has been endorsed without question by the Orthodox authorities in Moscow. This has caused a schism within Orthodoxy, but there are ripples beyund just the Orthodox, because for instance, Anglicans draw prestige as a senior Christian denomination by likening themselves to Orthodox as apostolic and sacramental, but with a separate national identity.

If Orthodoxy fails, so much the more do Anglicans, at least to the extent they haven't failed already. I think Pope Francis sees opportunities here but is treading carefully indeed.

The Peter Brooke essay covers a great deal more than Orthodoxy in its treatment of Solzhenitsyn as a specifically Cold War figure. In one section of the essay, RICHARD PIPES AND 'OLD RUSSIA' he outlines Richard Pipes's position in US intelligence:

In the 1970s, when Solzhenitsyn was in despair over the American defeat in Vietnam (did he have any idea of the means by which America was waging war in Vietnam?) and urging the US to stand firm against Communism, Pipes was running 'Team B', set up by the then head of the CIA, George Bush (Sr), to second guess the conclusions that were being drawn by the American intelligence community that the Soviet Union was in economic difficulties which were having an unfavourable effect on its military capacity. It therefore posed less of a military threat, a conclusion that was naturally unwelcome to the US military establishment and the armaments industry. Team B was set up by the then Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, and included among its members a younger Paul Wolfowitz. It was the model for the later 'Office of Special Plans', set up by Wolfowitz in 2002, also under Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defence, to undermine the CIA's assessment that the Iraqi government had little or nothing in the way of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

In the 1970s, then, Pipes and Solzhenitsyn could be described as (to use an old Marxist Leninist term) 'objective' allies in opposition to the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's policy of détente with the Soviet Union.

One surprise of the Russo-Ukraine war has clearly been the weakness and incompetence of the Russian military, which appears to have been foreshadowed by the internal conflicts in US intelligence in the 1970s. Yet Solzhenitsyn, to the extent that he tried to become a US political figure while he was here, effectively allied himself with the neoconservatives who promoted the idea that Russia was a world power comparable to the US. But Brooke goes on to point out that Solzhenitsyn actually isn't very Orthodox:

I discussed Solzhenitsyn's somewhat ambiguous attitude to historic Orthodoxy in an article published in 2010 in the online Dublin Review of Books, and I feel I can't do better than to repeat what I wrote then:

'The major theme of the Templeton Address, which Solzhenitsyn gave in 1984, is that the horrors that surround us derive from our loss of a sense of responsibility to something higher than ourselves - to God: "If I were asked today to formulate as concisely as possible the main cause of the ruinous Revolution that swallowed up some sixty millions of our people, I could not put it more accurately than to repeat: Men have forgotten God; that's why all this has happened."

. . . Indeed, given the importance Solzhenitsyn attaches to religion, there is something a little odd about his attitude to the Orthodox Church ... Although he often refers to the martyrdom of the priests, monks and nuns of the Orthodox Church under Bolshevism, there are very few priests mentioned in The Gulag Archipelago.

. . . When he does mention the Orthodox Church he is often critical of it. One of his recurring themes is the sin which the Church committed in its persecution of the Old Believers - Orthodox Christians who refused to accept certain reforms of liturgical practice that were introduced in the seventeenth century. Without ever going into it very deeply Solzhenitsyn several times refers to the Old Believers as representing the genuine spirit of Old Russia. He sees the reforms of Peter the Great (when the supposedly independent patriarchate of Moscow was suppressed and the Church reduced to being a department of state after the manner of the Church of England) as an extension of the crime committed against the Old Believers.

So for Solzhenitsyn, Orthodoxy is something of a reified entity that represents some authentic quality of the past that's no longer present, which sorta-kinda explains the USSR (but not present-day Russia, apparently). Beyond that, Brooke suggests that Solzhenitsyn at least leaned toward a view that only a version of Christianity that had a centralized authority in opposition to the State -- i.e., Roman Catholicism -- could succeed against the USSR at the time he wrote. But post-USSR Putin, the apparent majority of present-day Russians, and much of the Western right continue to be of the view that a State-sonsored conservative Russian Orthodoxy will save the world from dissipation, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a righteous instrument of this view.

We simply don't know how Solzhenitsyn would react to Putin and the invasion of Ukraine. Brooke's tentative conclusion seems to be that Solzhenitsyn, like Dostoevsky, was not ultimately a rationalist, and it's hard to avoid thinking Solzhenitsyn's view would be emotionally pro-Russian, bolstered by an incomplete understanding of Orthodoxy, although I'm not sure if there can on fact be a rationalist justification for Orthodoxy at all. But that's a different subject. The big problem I see for now is that an essentially emotional view of Russia and Russian Orthodoxy can't survive the current war.