The Foreign Policy Establishmen Looks At Canada, Comes Up Short
After I made yesterday's post, I was still left with the question of what the US alternatives would be if Canada made some sort of move toward a military alliance with Russia or China. The closest I came to anything like an answer was this paper from last June at the Stimson Institute, When Formal Alliances Stop Doing Political Work: The Canada-US Alliance in Crisis. Reading it, I found the usual gas clouds of conventionial wisdom, so I asked the AI oracle, "Is the Stimson Center part of the foreign policy establishment?" It replied,
Yes, the Stimson Center is widely considered part of the Washington foreign policy establishment. Founded in 1989 and named after the legendary bipartisan statesman Henry L. Stimson, the Stimson Center operates at the core of mainstream international relations. It is routinely ranked among the top think tanks in the United States, actively advising government agencies, educating Congress, and shaping conventional wisdom on global security. [emphasis mine]
Apparently conventional wisdom is regarded as a good thing within the foreign policy establishment. Here's basically what the piece says:
By 2014, Ottawa was devoting roughly one percent of GDP to defense, half the NATO obligation it reaffirmed that same year at the Wales Summit. As recently as 2024, Justin Trudeau was dismissing the two-percent target as a “crass mathematical calculation” that missed the point of what Canada contributed. It was a defensible argument, made indefensible by the fact that Canada wasn’t contributing much of anything to compensate.
Mark Carney changed that fast. His government hit two percent in fiscal 2025-26 — the first time since the Cold War ended — with a spending surge his government called the largest since the Korean War, and committed to NATO’s new five-percent target by 2035. More than the numbers, he changed the language, telling Canadians the country could no longer assume the United States would defend it and had to invest in its own capacity to “control its own destiny.”
. . . Then Carney traveled to Beijing in January 2026, and this is where the trouble compounded. During his visit, Carney announced what his government called a “new strategic partnership” with Xi Jinping — the first such meeting between Canadian and Chinese heads of state in eight years.
. . . So, to recap: Canada did everything Washington had demanded for years on spending and then announced a partnership with America’s principal competitor. And, on top of that, Canada’s leader gave a speech Washington read as filing the United States under hegemonic threat alongside China. The suspension of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense followed. Whether or not the reading was fair, it is the one that mattered, and it drained what was left of Washington’s trust in the compact.
Here the limit of Canada’s skating room becomes the point. Carney can describe Canada as a middle power maneuvering between larger ones. But, in addition to drawing on a certain nostalgia for a bygone era when Canada claimed to be a “middle power” that routinely punched above its weight in global affairs, this vocabulary is borrowed from states whose geography lets them use it.
. . . The UAE, for example, practices that kind of multi-alignment — leaning on Washington for security while deepening economic ties to Beijing — because no treaty binds Abu Dhabi to the United States. Canada does not realistically have that option. It can argue with Washington, but it cannot behave as though it stands outside the continental defense system it helps operate. That is what distinguishes Ottawa from Abu Dhabi and Mexico City, and what will ultimately make the middle-power rhetoric impossible for the Carney government and its successors to translate into meaningful defense policy.
So on one hand, the piece concludes that at least as far as Carney articulates it, the Canadian strategy is meaningless. But how, precisely?
One important fact gets lost in the day-to-day friction between the White House and the Prime Minster’s Office. Canada has not had a genuine strategic alternative to the United States since the Second World War, and geography alone makes that true. There is no escaping the American relationship, whatever a prime minister says in Davos. Washington knows it, and some U.S. officials seem to have concluded that Canadian dependence allows for unlimited pressure.
But the authors are talking defense strategy, and that's so plain that it's beside the point. The problem is that Canada is also dependent economically, but the authors are basically saying that's not fair or something.
Washington should stop treating continental defense as a collection point for unrelated economic grievances; coercion aimed at a partner with nowhere else to go buys compliance now and resentment later.
But the current exchanges between Ottawa and Washington, as far as I've been able to see, haven't mentioned defense at all. As of a week ago,
US President Donald Trump has said Canada wants "the benefits of being a state, without being one" after trade talks between the two countries collapsed late on Friday.
The breakdown of negotiations triggered new 50% US tariffs on a range of Canadian goods. Trump also said American farmers had been charged "massive amounts of Tariffs" for years.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called the fresh tariffs a "miscalculation" designed to "hurt and divide us".
The issue basically boils down to whether Canada should get favorable tariff treatment so that it can maintain certain industries like autos at prices it can export to the US market. If it were a state, it would be in the same position as Michigan. If it were a state, it would also have the full protection of the US military, but that's not currently under discussion -- nevertheless, it's relevant to the overall question of whether Canada has a free ride. I don't think you can split the questions in two.But even under defense alone, the authors neglect the question they do raise: if Carney's "middle power" strategy is meaningless, nevertheless, what happens if he's delusional enough to cogitate a defense alliance with China? I betcha both the US State and Defense Departments have contingency plans for such a thing. Why not bring that up? I asked the oracle, "What prevents Canada from making a defense alliance with Russia or China?" It answered, in part,
Canada shares the world’s longest undefended border with the United States. Geographically, Canada has no choice but to be integrated into North American security. A Canadian military alliance with Russia or China would be viewed by Washington as an existential national security threat, making it practically impossible.
I followed up with the oracle, "What would be the potential US response if Canada signed a military alliance with China?" It gave a remarkably clear-headed reply:
If Canada were to sign a formal military alliance with China, the U.S. response would be an immediate, severe, and existential national security crisis, fundamentally altering North American geopolitics. Given the current 2026 climate—characterized by intense economic friction between Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government and President Donald Trump, including crippling tariffs and Canada's strategic economic pivots toward Beijing—a military alliance would cross Washington's ultimate red line.The potential U.S. response would unfold across economic, military, and political dimension.
For over two centuries, the U.S.-Canada border has been the longest undefended border in the world. A military alliance with China would force the U.S. to immediately deploy the U.S. Armed Forces, National Guard, and massive surveillance infrastructure along the 5,525-mile northern border.
The U.S. would treat the alliance as an intolerable violation of the Monroe Doctrine, which opposes foreign military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. military would likely establish a strict naval blockade or airspace restriction to prevent the transport of Chinese military assets, personnel, or advanced weaponry into Canadian territory.
. . . High-level political rhetoric regarding the annexation or forced subjugation of Canada—already a point of systemic friction in contemporary political discourse—would materialize into active operational planning. If Chinese troops or military installations were actively being deployed to Canadian soil, the U.S. would highly consider a preemptive military invasion to neutralize the threat before Chinese forces could establish a permanent foothold.
The problem of "Canadian sovereignty" is neither exclusively military nor economic, but it is in fact existential to both countries. It's worth asking whether Carney is in fact delusional over both the economic and military factors underlying any belief that Canada has much freedom of action in these areas at all -- but he's certainly talking as though it does. They make their own weather, after all.The foreign policy establishment is pushing the idea that everyone can sit down and talk this out. But if Carney is delusional, can we really?




