A T Mahan And Current Strategy

It's actually almost commonplace to say that the Battle of Jutland was a counterexample to Mahan's theory of the decisive naval battle, but this gives only a partial view of Mahan's theories. According to Wikipedia, the other half of Mahan's theories covered blackades:

Mahan's works encouraged the development of large capital ships—eventually leading to dreadnought battleships—as he was an advocate of the 'decisive battle' and of naval blockades.

He wrote extensively on blockades, for instance, here. As far as I can see, in Mahan's view, if a decisive naval battle determined control of the sea, control of the sea in turn meant the ability to impose blockades. This is something this critique of post-World War II US strategy neglects:

Mahanian theory was a poor predictor of events in World War I, but it could be argued that Mahan’s theory was vindicated in World War II. In 1945 the United States Navy stood at the height of its power. Relatively new as a capital ship force—the first modern battleships of the great white fleet had sailed in 1907—the US Navy undertook a massive expansion to prepare for war, both materially and philosophically. Pearl Harbor demonstrated how the battleship had been eclipsed by the aircraft carrier. The Navy immediately adapted—taking what it learned at Pearl Harbor, the Navy grew to thirty fleet carriers by 1945, and added hundreds of smaller ships to fight Japan in a distinctly Mahanian fashion. Ultimately the primary tool of victory in the Pacific was carrier power.

. . . But the lessons taken from World War II and the rationale for a battle fleet of capital ships was a selective one that ignored how World War II was a two-ocean war, and how the war in the Pacific had a markedly different character from the war in the Atlantic. The war in the Atlantic was not a carrier war, but rather one in which the primary threat was the German U-boat, a formidable enemy whose potential success threatened the entire Allied war effort. The Atlantic was a small-boy war of destroyers, escorts, and antisubmarine aircraft, with little Mahanian theory influencing the plan. To defeat the undersea U-boat threat, the Navy relied on a unique combination of defensive measures, intelligence, and small-unit actions.

But Mahan's theory embraced both the Atlantic and Pacific wars. In his view, the German strategy in both world wars was "commerce raiding", piecemeal attacks on civilian commerce by both capital ships and submarines.

The great Anglo-American naval theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—the Colomb brothers, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Julian Corbett—all dismissed it as an indecisive strategy of the weak. Imperial Germany’s turn to unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 failed to achieve its political purpose, instead bringing the United Sates into the war just as war weariness and revolution threatened to undermine the Etente’s military effectiveness.

In World War II, the German plan to use surface capital ships in commerce raiding failed, while US entry in the Atlantic war effectively reduced the U-boat threat by mid-1943. On the other hand, the UK was able to maintain a blockade against Germany in both world wars, although the one in the 1914 war was much more complete. In fact, the tactical draw in the 1916 Battle of Jutland was a strategic victory for the UK, even though the UK was no more willing to risk its fleet in another decisive battle than Germany, because Germany's hesitancy in venturing its fleet outward allowed the UK to continue its blockade.

The citique of Mahanian strategy above misses an important point:

Aircraft carriers, while impressive, are becoming increasingly vulnerable, not less so. The newer threats of hypersonic missiles, targeting from space, and cyber present unique challenges for the US Navy and the loss of a single carrier will have enormous consequences. Additionally, even if the US Navy achieves command of the sea, it may be irrelevant due to modern strike capabilities. History has shown that the ability to strike an adversary’s mainland from sea is not decisive in war—including examples from North Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Except that in two of the examples he cites, North Vietnam and Iraq, aircraft carriers were used to enforce blockades -- and they've been used as well in the Cuban missile crisis, the blockade of Serbia 1992-96, and the blockades of Iran and Venezuela tnis year. These cases are similar to Mahan's view of the Union blockade of the Confederacy -- the Union had default control of the sea; neither the Confederate navy nor any third power could challenge it, which meant its ability to enforce the blockade was complete, within the technological limits of the period. Post-World War II deployments of US carriers and carrier groups have been effective in part because there's no effective counterbalance to US naval dominance.

It's a misinterpretation of Mahan to say he stresses decisive naval battles with capital ships. These are only tools to achieve naval dominance. The US achieved naval dominance by 1945, and there have been no effective challenges to it since then. The question is what a country can do with naval dominance, and that includes the ability to impose blockades. This is something Trump recognizes, probably better than any recent president.