Why Don't They Update The Maps?

I'm stumped. Above is this morning's map for the Ukraine theater of the Plebe War. As far as I can tell, the ISW site is the most prestigious ongoing assessment of the war's progress, but it's been misleading in important ways from the start.

First, I think it's generally acknowledged that the thick pink blobs that are said to denote "Assessed Russian-Controlled Ukrainian Territory" do not reflect the fact that the actual Russian controlled areas are really just thin lines along roads where Russian units advanced as of several weeks ago. The truth is Ukrainian forces operate freely within all the pink blobs and conduct attacks on Russian convoys at will there.

Second, the conventional wisdom at this point is that the Russian advances are "stalled" on all fronts except within Mariupol. For more than a week, the ISW assessments have consistently said nothing but words to the effect of "Russian forces did not make any major advances on March. . .", but they're now beginning to add, ". . . Ukrainian forces conducted local counterattacks northwest of Kyiv and around Mykolayiv."

In fact, there are increasing reports from different sources that Russian troops northwest of Kyiv are now encircled, for instance, here. The map key has a blue area to indicate "Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives" but in several weeks of following the ISW site, I haven't seen them add a single blue area for a claimed Ukrainian counteroffensive other than a tiny, almost invisible line northwest of Kharkhiv. But isn't a counteroffensive that cuts off the key suburbs northwest of Kyiv, "claimed" or not, eligible for inclusion on the map?

The same would apply to the area around Mykolaiv, which Ukraine has claimed to be recaptured. Per the Daily Kos a week ago,

Well, just a few hours ago, we got confirmation that Ukraine had taken Posad-Pokrovskote, which in itself isn’t a noteworthy place. What matters is where it is located: smack center between Mykolaiv and Kherson. That means Russia has been pushed back an incredible 120 kilometers (75 miles) from Voznesensk. More importantly, Russia has been pushed out at least 35 kilometers (22 miles) from Mykolaiv—out of range of most Russian artillery. Ukraine is now less than 30 kilometers (18 miles) from Kherson airport, which would be a massive morale boost. And the airport is just outside Kherson’s city limits.

Shouldn't there have been a blue dotted-line area from just north of Kherson to past Mykolaiv on the map? I mean, since a week ago? Instead, that area, which the best information seems to indicate is still in Ukrainian hands, is still listed on the map as a "claimed Russian advance".

Meanwhile, the retired US general talking heads are pretty much all gone from YouTube, which means they're also gone from network news. When they were on, they gave versions that ranged between defeatist to noncommittal on the prospects for Ukrainian success.

Eliot Cohen's question is worth asking: why can't the west admit that Ukraine is winning? It's a serious question, and the answer is non-trivial. For instance, I'm following the war with great interest and hungry for the latest information. But I'm a retired guy with lots of free time. Fine -- but the retired generals ought to know more than I do, except they don't seem to. The people at ISW are the professionals who do this full time.

I think deliberate obtuseness is one explanation for what's going on.

UPDATE: A report on a revised map from NBC News Chief Correspondent Richard Engel:

Ukraine making big gains around kyiv. I got a brief (with an unclassified map) from two top municipal officials pic.twitter.com/zASEbmISyJ

— Richard Engel (@RichardEngel) March 23, 2022

Why can't the ISW map be revised with these officially "claimed" Ukrainian advances?

"Why Can’t The West Admit That Ukraine Is Winning?"

There's been a flurry of leaked or blurted reports from the Russian side on its actual casualties in Ukraine. According to the UK Daily Mail,

Russia has lost almost 10,000 soldiers in less than four weeks in Ukraine, according to its own figures.

The death toll – an incredible tally for a war that the Kremlin believed would be over within days – was published by a pro-government website, but quickly taken down.

There was speculation that it was uploaded by a pro-Ukrainian employee. Russia had previously admitted to 498 deaths – but that was on March 2.

Although this estimate is at least deniable, this still exceeds the estimates of "more than 7,000" that have been the consensus in US media, apparently based on information from the Pentagon. However, another Russian leak gives an even bigger total.

A former internal affairs minister of #Ukraine @AvakovArsen shared the intercepted Russian military summary for March 18: Rus. Army troops killed 12,814. Private company Liga (former Vagner) troops killed 4,451. Total number ofservicemembers killed at war in Ukraine: 17,265. pic.twitter.com/TuSTIyHW5n

— Victor Kovalenko (@MrKovalenko) March 21, 2022

Ukraine's official current estimate of Russian deaths as of yesterday is "about 15,000", which is generally in line with the Twitter leak above.

This suggests to me that the Pentagon estimates on which the US media relies have been too conservative -- at this point, underestimating the real total by as much as 50%, which is enough to be seriously misleading. The only commentator to raise any question so far about this is Eliot Cohen, a deep-state Ivy Leaguer who was an architect of the failed Bush Jr policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. He has a current piece in The Atlantic, Why Can’t the West Admit That Ukraine Is Winning?

Analysts and commentators have grudgingly declared that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been blocked, and that the war is stalemated. The more likely truth is that the Ukrainians are winning.

Well, if he never had the right answers, at least now he's come up with the right question. He goes on,

So why can’t Western analysts admit as much? Most professional scholars of the Russian military first predicted a quick and decisive Russian victory; then argued that the Russians would pause, learn from their mistakes, and regroup; then concluded that the Russians would actually have performed much better if they had followed their doctrine; and now tend to mutter that everything can change, that the war is not over, and that the weight of numbers still favors Russia. Their analytic failure will be only one of the elements of this war worth studying in the future.

. . . The evidence that Ukraine is winning this war is abundant, if one only looks closely at the available data. The absence of Russian progress on the front lines is just half the picture, obscured though it is by maps showing big red blobs, which reflect not what the Russians control but the areas through which they have driven. . . . Russian losses are staggering—between 7,000 and 14,000 soldiers dead, depending on your source, which implies (using a low-end rule of thumb about the ratios of such things) a minimum of nearly 30,000 taken off the battlefield by wounds, capture, or disappearance. Such a total would represent at least 15 percent of the entire invading force, enough to render most units combat ineffective.

However, the simple arithmetic I've done here suggests that although the total Russian invasion force was maybe 150,000, the actual numbers in the combat brigades doing the fighting are more like 42,000. If Cohen's estimate of those taken off the battlefield is 30,000, then the Russian brigades have fallen well below simple combat ineffectiveness. Anecdotal reports of 80% casualties in some Russian brigades seem perfectly reasonable in this context.

It's worth noting that as of late last week, the few retired US generals who were still giving prognostications in the media were saying the Russian attack would "culminate" within ten to 14 days -- but as of the weekend, all the respectable open-surce sites were declaring the attack "culminated", meaningless as that term may be, at least a week ahead of projections.

So Cohen may well have a point. On the other hand, as a career deep-stater, his conclusions are remarkably limited:

Most commentators have taken too narrow a view of this conflict, presenting it as solely between Russia and Ukraine.

True, true. But who are the actual adversaries?

Like most wars, though, it is being waged by two coalitions, fought primarily though not exclusively by Russian and Ukrainian nationals. The Russians have some Chechen auxiliaries who have yet to demonstrate much effectiveness (and who lost their commander early on), may get some Syrians (who will be even less able to integrate with Russian units), and find a half-hearted ally in Belarus, whose citizens have begun sabotaging its rail lines and whose army may well mutiny if asked to invade Ukraine.

Oh, quack, quack, quack. He goes on,

The Ukrainians have their auxiliaries, too, some 15,000 or so foreign volunteers, some probably worthless or dangerous to their allies, but others valuable—snipers, combat medics, and other specialists who have fought in Western armies. More important, they have behind them the military industries of countries including the United States, Sweden, Turkey, and the Czech Republic.

But if you ask me, the US is half-hearted at best, and neither NATO nor the EU has been unanimous. The biggest problem continues to be Joe Biden, who was making big baksheesh from Ukraine until Zelensky was voted president in 2019 and finally fired Hunter from Burisma. Biden and his deep-state allies never liked Zelensky and even as we speak are doing everything they can to delay effective aid.

The fight is much more a coalition of broad bourgeois and working-class interests in Europe and the US against an established deep-state status quo that enabled Putin for a generation. This is why the US media and politically astute generals have been maintaining a generally defeatist line on Ukraine. I would guess that Eliot Cohen's heart is with the gentry as well -- his analysis is ultimately obtuse, almost deliberately so.

Pope Francis, Just War, And Clausewitz

This piece at Breitbart reports on remarks by Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin on the Ukraine conflict:

“The use of weapons is never something desirable, because it always carries a very high risk of taking the life of people or causing serious injury and terrible material damage,” Cardinal Parolin told the Spanish Catholic weekly Vida Nueva when asked whether European nations should be sending weapons to Ukraine.

“Nonetheless, the right to defend one’s life, one’s people and one’s country sometimes also involves the sad recourse to arms,” the cardinal recognized. “At the same time both sides must refrain from the use of prohibited weapons and fully respect international humanitarian law to protect civilians and non-combatants.”

“On the other hand, although military aid to Ukraine may be understandable, the search for a negotiated solution, which silences weapons and prevents a nuclear escalation, remains a priority,” Parolin added.

The piece then draws an unwarranted conclusion, that this is "an apparent contradiction of Pope Francis’ rejection of Catholic 'just war' doctrine."

On Friday, Pope Francis ruled out the possibility of “just wars,” saying they do not exist.

. . . “Wars are always unjust,” he said, “because those who pay are the people of God. Our hearts cannot fail to weep in front of the children, the women killed, all the victims of war.”

In its explanation of “just war doctrine,” the Catechism of the Catholic Church, a compendium of Catholic belief, lays out a series of conditions necessary to justify the use of military force, summing up the teachings proposed by Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas.

The implication seems to be that Pope Francis is yet again contradicting Catholic doctrine, but I don't see this. As far as I can tell, Cardinal Parolin's remarks appear to have been very carefully drafted, and at least as quoted, he doesn't use the specific phrase "just war". He does refer to an implied natural "right to defend one’s life, one’s people and one’s country", but he also says the use of weapons is "never something desirable". He says "military aid to Ukraine may be understandable", but this is quite some distance from saying it's a just war.

In fact, I would almost put this in the context of Catholic moral theology that on one hand recognizes there are objective sins, but on the other also recognizes mitigating factors -- on one hand, a child steals a loaf of bread; on the other, the child is starving and hasn't been to Sunday school.

Elsewhere, quoting the Washington Post behind a paywall, this report says,

Pope Francis on Friday denounced the “perverse abuse of power” on display in Russia’s war in Ukraine and called for aid to Ukrainians who he said had been attacked in their “identity, history and tradition” and were “defending their land.” …

It came just days after Francis told the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, that the concept of a “just war” was obsolete since wars are never justifiable and that pastors must preach peace, not politics.

So it looks as though there's little or no actual daylight between Pope Francis and Cardinal Parolin. Parolin does not use the term "just war", but like Francis, he says Ukrainians are defending their land and their national identity, a sad state of affairs that has been forced on them. In fact, it looks as though the Vatican has a consistent foreign policy here, especially in light of the large Ukrainian Catholic minority there. It simply falls short of calling anything a "just war".

A recent blog post by the neo-Thomist philosopher Edward Feser outlines, I think, the core of the Vatican's problem. He quotes the relevant part of the Catechism on the criteria for just war and concludes,

[M]ilitary action to repel Russia’s invasion clearly is legitimate, and justice requires favoring the Ukrainian side in the war. In the abstract, support for Ukraine could include military action against Russia by any nation friendly to Ukraine. However, the justice of the cause of defending Ukraine fulfills only the first of the four criteria set out by the Catechism. What about the other three?

. . . Even a localized nuclear exchange would also render unlikely the fulfillment of the third condition for just war, viz. the “serious prospects of success.” If Russia uses nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO itself, would NATO countries really retaliate in kind? If they did not, it seems that Russian victory would be assured. But if they did retaliate in kind, it is very far from clear that this would not spiral into a conflict that no one could win. Nor can it be said that all the less extreme alternatives to NATO intervention have been exhausted, as the second criterion for just war requires.

Feser's overall argument is specific to an issue that arose earlier in the war, whether the US or other actors should impose a no-fly zone. He concludes that this could lead to a nuclear escalation, which would create "evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated". The problem, though, is that while the specific question of a no-fly zone has faded in importance, other issues have also changed the balance. The third just war criterion, there must be serious prospects of success, seems to have tilted in Ukraine's favor in subsequent weeks even without the no-fly zone.

But in general, rereading Feser's post in light of subsequent public remarks from both Francis and Cardinal Parolin, I suspect those behind the Vatican's public position went through a mental process close to Feser's.

The difficulty with declaring a "just war", I think, is also implied in Clausewitz's concept of friction:

Theoretically all sounds very well; the commander of a battalion is responsible for the execution of the order given; and as the battalion by its discipline is glued together into one piece, and the chief must be a man of acknowledged zeal, the beam turns on an iron pin with little friction. But it is not so in reality, and all that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests itself at once in war. . . . Further, every war is rich in particular facts; while, at the same time, each is an unexplored sea, full of rocks, which the general may have a suspicion of, but which he has never seen with his eye, and round which, moreover, he must steer in the night.

Circumstances change from battle to battle and from day to day, and the fog of war surrounds everything. Evaluating the criteria for a "just war" in a modern context is harder and harder. For now, I think Francis and Parolin are being both realisic and prudent, while at the same time, the prayers of Catholic parishes at mass these past few Sundays have clearly been for the people of Ukraine.

Clausewitz And The Culmination Point

The Institute for the Study of War site, which appears to be the most prestigious commentator on the Russo-Ukraine war, has made what strikes me as a meaningless pronouncement:

Ukrainian forces have defeated the initial Russian campaign of this war. That campaign aimed to conduct airborne and mechanized operations to seize Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and other major Ukrainian cities to force a change of government in Ukraine. That campaign has culminated.

I've noted on YouTube for the past week or two references to Clausewitzian "culmination" as a point where an attack exhausts itself. But that can take place either before it achieves its objective, in which case it's a victory for the defender, or after, in which case it's a victory for the attacker. But in either case, it leaves open the question of what happens next. Clausewitz himself seems to have recognized the problem:

The success of the attack is the result of a present superiority of force, it being understood that the moral as well as physical forces are included. In the preceding chapter we have shown that the power of the attack gradually exhausts itself; possibly at the same time the superiority may increase, but in most cases it diminishes. . . . There are strategic attacks which have led to an immediate peace but such instances are rare; the majority, on the contrary, lead only to a point at which the forces remaining are just sufficient to maintain a defensive, and to wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns, there is a reaction; the violence of such a reaction is commonly much greater than the force of the blow. This we call the culminating point of the attack. . . . If we reflect upon the number of the elements of which an equation of the forces in action is composed, we may conceive how difficult it is in many cases to determine which of two opponents has the superiority on his side. Often all hangs on the silken thread of imagination.

So basically, Clausewitz is saying you can look at a situation and think there may have been a culmination point, but that depends on how you see it, and you can't reliably say what will happen afterward anyhow. I had to read many such papers in graduate school. Why did the Institute for the Study of War even bother? Was it all the retired general talking heads mentioning Clausewitz and sounding smart? The Institute goes on:

The culmination of the initial Russian campaign is creating conditions of stalemate throughout most of Ukraine. Russian forces are digging in around the periphery of Kyiv and elsewhere, attempting to consolidate political control over areas they currently occupy, resupplying and attempting to reinforce units in static positions, and generally beginning to set conditions to hold in approximately their current forward positions for an indefinite time.

But Clausewitz himself says it's hard to know when the culmination has been reached, and it's just as hard to know what it means. Clausewitzian culmination is thus a sorta-kinda tautology. Why is the Institute so definite, and why is it so certain of the outcome when Clausewitz himself is neither?

My own instinctive view is that Ukrainian artillery appears to be awfully good, and Russians dug into fixed positions have supply issues. I would expect more cases like the Kherson airfield, a fixed position repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian artilery. But what do I know? They threw me out of ROTC.

In another theater of the Plebe War, Biden’s Handlers Are Preparing to Eject Him (and Kamala):

[T]he people who put Joe Biden in power—I cannot name them, but I know they are the same people who keep him in power—do not care about inflation, rising gas and food prices, COVID lockdowns or mask mandates, the porousness of our Southern border, the threat of war with Russia, or the myriad other issues that worry ordinary voters. . . . Joe Biden is an errand boy, a figurehead, in the metabolism of this great (not to say Great Society) act of political legerdemain.

. . . Why do you suppose that the New York Times has decided, finally, at this late date, to acknowledge that the story that the New York Post broke about Hunter’s laptop was true?

. . . I suspect that Joe Biden is being prepped for ejection. Exactly how it will happen I do not yet know. But he is on the threshold, or possibly has even passed the threshold, where he could appear to govern. His minders understand this. They must be the ones to replace him, otherwise they themselves risk being replaced, which would be intolerable. As I say, it’s not entirely clear yet how the defenestration will take place. Obviously, Kamala will have to be dealt with first, and she will be. Look for some ground softening stories such as the Times just served up about the laptop. They won’t be long in coming.

Seems like there's maybe a culmination taking place, not just in Ukraine, but in the whole Plebe War. But as Clausewtiz himself would tell us, "Often all hangs on the silken thread of imagination."

If anyone asks, here's my theory of how this could play out. It doesn't really matter whether Kamala or Joe goes first; there must be an overabundance of undeclared baksheesh in either case, or in Joe's, no shortage of gropes, grabs, and Zucker-like behavior. Under the 25th Amendment, no matter if Kamala or Joe goes first, whichever survives must nominate a new vice president, who must be confirmed by both houses of congress. That's likely to take a while, given the pivotal role of Sen Manchin in the evenly divided Senate (indeed as well, with no sitting vice president in such a case to break a Senate tie).

In fact, if either Kamala or Joe leaves before the November election, the issue probably won't be resolved until afterward, with likely Republican majorities in both houses. Thus any nominee for vice president after the election from either Democrat survivor in the presidency would have an even harder time geting approved.

But if there's a Republican House in January 2023, Kevin McCarthy would likely be speaker. The speaker is third in line, but with no vice president approved under the 25th Amendment, he'd be number two. But with either Kamala or Joe as an unsatisfactory/intolerable president, even for the lizard people, they'd force the removal of either, with McCarthy then moving into the Oval Office. Given this scenario, I will grant Roger Kimball's implied postulate that this would be easy and quick, but only under a Kimball-like scenario.

You heard it here first.

The Plebe War Is Not Going To Plan

Something's up.

A comprehensive report about the ongoing federal probe into Hunter Biden’s tax filings published by the New York Times on Wednesday night confirmed the existence of the first son’s infamous laptop.

The puzzling thing is although the New York Post broke the story in October 2020, and other outlets have since acknowledged the laptop is authentic, that the New York Times would belatedly report it is clearly big news. But nothing has changed about the story at all, except that the Times now says it's a story. Trump's reaction is understandable:

Former President Trump said the New York Times has admitted being a part of an effort to 'rig' the election for Joe Biden with their report confirming the authenticity of Hunter Biden's laptop and its contents.

Trump said in a statement on Friday, 500 days after the November 2, 2020, general election: 'The New York Times just admitted that it participated in an effort to rig the election for Joe Biden.'

When files from the laptop were published before the 2020 presidential election, the newspaper cast doubt on its provenance, linked it to Russian disinformation, and made no public attempt to obtain and verify it.

I've been mildly interested in Trump's more recent statements about the 2020 election, as well as the evolution of January 6 coverage. The bottom line is that you don't necessarily need to believe there was specific election fraud, or at least election fraud sufficient to change the outcome, to think something was hinky about it, not least that it put quite possibly the worst president in US history into office. If you take the meaning of "rig" to imply a general effort to deceive the public on key issues, rather than a simple exercise in stuffing ballot boxes, I don't think you can claim Trump is delusional.

But why the Times's about-face? After all, it's never disavowed the Pulitzer it received for its reporting on the Ukraine famine of the 1930s. Why not just let it lie? Maybe it's this:

The attorney for Lunden Alexis Roberts - the mother of one of Hunter Biden's five children - revealed he turned over to federal investigators a 'significant amount' of Hunter's financial records and said he would be 'surprised' if he was not indicted.

Clint Lancaster, who represents Roberts, said that he was complying with a subpoena in turning over 'a significant amount of Hunter's financial records,' and that both he and Roberts were interviewed by investigators.

The pretext for the Times story was reporting that Hunter had paid a million dollars in back taxes (wait a moment - isn't Hunter broke?), but it sounds like that alone won't make his problems go away. There's an investigation involving his "financial records". That can't help but involve the Big Guy.

I think someone, maybe not even at the Times itself, but someone who tells the Times what to print, decided it was time to get ahead of the story, which sounds like it might be big, and it would only be big if the Big Guy were involved. This story raises a related question about yesterday's Psaki press conference and questions from New York Post reporter Steve Nelson

Nelson asked three questions. First, if Biden was staying out of the DOJ investigation of his son. Psaki claimed he was. Then Nelson raised the Senate report about Hunter Biden’s company, Rosemont Seneca Thornton, allegedly receiving $3.5 million from Russian billionaire Yelena Baturina, one of the richest women in Russia whose late husband used to be the mayor of Moscow. Nelson also raised a point that is not as well known — the report that Joe Biden himself had a subsequent meeting with the same woman for dinner in 2015 in Georgetown.

“This Yelena Baturina, she has not been sanctioned yet by the U.S. government. How is President Biden navigating conflicts of interest when it comes to sanctioning people who have done business with this family and can you explain to us what this $3.5 million was for?” Nelson asked.

“I don’t have any confirmation of the accuracy of that report, so I have no more further details,” Psaki declared.

How could you not know about the accuracy of the report? Either Joe Biden met with her or he did not. What did he meet with her for? That’s not a Hunter question; that’s a Joe Biden question. But Psaki refused to answer and be transparent.

The 2020 election was an opening campaign in the Plebe War, and other developments, like Putin's invasion of Ukraine, have resulted from it. Keep in mind that treason and bribery are among the high crimes and misdemeanors that can lead to impeachment. I think Ukraine news is going to fade pretty quickly, not leat because that's also not going to plan.

Another Crack At The Numbers

The video above doesn't look like it was produced by the Ukrainian government. It may or may not have been released with their approval. I find it particularly interesting, though, because it was taken by two women driving in a civilian car along the length of what must have been a Russian battalion tactical group some days afer it had been attacked by the Ukrainians. Around the third time I watched it, I realized that between the occasional remaining burned-out trucks, there are large patches of bare roadway without snow.

This says to me that there had been no snow on the ground before the battle, but it did snow soon afterward. Over a day or two following the battle, the Ukrainians were able to drive or tow away most of the Russian armored equipment, which explains the rectangular bare snowless patches in the road where the tanks and so forth had been. That's a lot of tanks. And if, unlike in some videos, there weren't a bunch of burned-out tanks, trucks, and personnel carriers left over, this suggests strongly that they're now part of the Ukrainian army.

Given the apparent size of the column that the women are driving past, my guess is that this was a battalion tactical group, which as I noted in Wednesday's post includes roughly 10 tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles. How can we relate this to the overall size of the Russian invasion force? The Ukrainian general staff has this estimate:

Approximately 200,000 Russian occupiers invaded Ukraine. 15,000 were killed and another 18,000-20,000 became already incapacitated.

In total, there are about 60 tactical groups operating in Ukraine now and 10 of them are in reserve.

As I've noted, estimates of the Russian BTGs in Ukraine range from 30 to 130. but 60 here is in the middle. 60 BTGs times 10 tanks per BTG is 600 tanks. The Oryx site tally, which lists only losses that can be confirmed by photos, says that as of this morning, the Russians have lost 244 tanks, of which 93 are destroyed, 4 are damaged, 41 are abandoned, and 106 are captured and presumably being refurbished for the Ukrainian army. This is a third of their combat power in tanks.

The Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovich quoted at the link says, "In 10-14 days they will be forced to defend themselves".

After that will begin tactical battles for small villages and for leveling positions. At the same time, the Russian military has no reinforcements.

"Even if all the reserves are involved, they will not be able to fundamentally change the situation. Russia's loss may become real in two or three weeks."

A piece at Hot Air, which quotes the New York Times behind a paywall, says

It [Russian, casualties] is a staggering number amassed in just three weeks of fighting, American officials say, with implications for the combat effectiveness of Russian units, including soldiers in tank formations. Pentagon officials say a 10 percent casualty rate, including dead and wounded, for a single unit renders it unable to carry out combat-related tasks.

With more than 150,000 Russian troops now involved in the war in Ukraine, Russian casualties, when including the estimated 14,000 to 21,000 injured, are near that level. And the Russian military has also lost at least three generals in the fight, according to Ukrainian, NATO and Russian officials.

However, the 150,000 number for Russian troops in the invasion force includes troops at all levels in all jobs. If we estimate 700 infantry in each BTG, 700 times 60 BTGs in the invasion makes 42,000 infantry total, and these will be the groups that primarily take casualties. The current conservative US estimate of Russian casualties is 7000 dead, wich makes about 17% of their combat forces, well over the 10 percent threshold cited in the link.

On the other hand, here is the current Ukrainian estimate of Russian losses:

The relevant statement was made by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Facebook, an Ukrinform correspondent reports.

“Between February 24, 2022 and March 18, 2022, the enemy’s total combat losses were as follows: 14,200 troops, 450 tanks, 1,448 armored fighting vehicles, 205 artillery systems, 72 multiple launch rocket systems,” the report states.

In addition, the Ukrainian military destroyed Russia’s 43 anti-aircraft warfare systems, 93 aircrafts, 112 helicopters, 879 motor vehicles, three boats/cutters, 60 fuel tanks, 12 unmanned aerial vehicles and 11 special equipment units.

It's worth noting again that the Oryx site tallies only losses that can be confirmed by photos of individual items. Oryx notes this and says, "the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here," so there is no reason specifically to doubt the Ukrainian general staff estimates -- but if the general staff says Russia has lost 450 tanks, this is in fact more than two thirds of the tanks in the original invasion force of 60 BTGs by their estimate.

Indeed, I've got to say that just judging from the video drive-bys of burned-out columns on YouTube, this estimate seems entirely reasonable, and based on that, the other numbers in the Ukrainian estimate seem in line as well.

I'm wondering if Russian collapse may come sooner than estimates of two to three weeks.

Leadership Vacuum

Although Ann Coulter is some years past her sell-by date, having veered from Trump is the Messiah to Never Trump in the meantime, her current take on Ukraine is representative of all too many on the right:

Until the war in Ukraine, the Democrats were facing midterms after having spent the previous two years mandating masks and an endless series of vaccinations — even for the vaccinated or previously infected.

, , , What could even Stalin’s media do with that record?

. . . By now, the media have whipped the public into such a frenzy over Ukraine that a majority of Americans want the U.S. to start shooting down Russian planes, starting World War III with nuclear armed power.

A small price to pay for Democratic dominance.

I'm not sure where to start with this. The media was reporting on the war for the first two weeks, when the narrative was universally about the 40-mile column about to close in on Kyiv. Once Ukraine began to demonstrate success, as far as I can tell without actually risking brain damage by watching the news shows, they've dropped most coverage -- the retired US general talking heads have all left YouTube, for instance. The 40-mile column has evaporated, and the farmers and gypsies are towing away the lighter weapons.

A web search on "russian advance stalled" brings up an unbelievable 2 million hits. As far as I can tell, nobody is actually whipping up war fever; they're too busy congratulating Dr Rachel Levine for getting Woman of the Year. A lot of thinkers on the right, though, agree with Coulter Biden is somehow going to hitchhike on President Zelensky to rescue the 2022 midterms. Someone ought to send them this meme and others like it:

Nobody is taking Biden's or Psaki's claims that he's been marshaling support for Ukraine behind the scenes seriously. He may be making a feeble effort to ride a Zelensky wave -- that is, as long as he doesn't actually have to do anything to ride it. Don't want to start World War III, after all. The public understands this fully, especially after the on again-off again-green light debacle over the Polish jet fighters.

The real issue right now is the public doesn't want Trump back; it doesn't want President Pence or President DeSantis; it badly wishes it could somehow hire President Zelensky. That guy has already made Putin look like a monkey. He'd finish the job on Biden too if it weren't for the fact that he can leverage the US congress to push Biden to send more aid. At least for now, Xi just isn't worth his time.

It's intriguing that in recent weeks, both Hillary Clinton and Mitt Romney sent up trial balloons to see if there might be chances of them making another presidential bid. Those both fell with a thud, but the fact that they would even consider it is a reflection of how little actual leadership there is in this country right now. I don't rule out that we'll hear from Al "Release My Second Chakra" Gore next.

If I were Mike Pence, I'd be beating feet to the Ukraine-Polish border, maybe even paying a visit to Kyiv. That would boost the chances of any other prospects, too. If Biden himself were to do it, that could even boost his own chances -- the issue is first, that he's too lazy, second, that he'd find a way to say exactly the wrong thing. Best to keep him in Delaware.

Let's Go Brandon! Godspeed Zelensky! Glory to Ukraine!