The US Right's Zelensky Problem

Yesterday, the Never Trump, Not Quite Zelensky Hot Air blog quoted Don Jr:

According to senior officials, [Biden's Lend-Lease] proposal, which includes $20.4bn in military aid, $8.5bn in economic aid and $3bn in humanitarian aid, is needed to "enable Ukraine's success over the next five months of this war".

Responding to the report, former president Donald Trump's eldest son suggested that the fund sent by the US would be "looted by corrupt politicians".

"Hard pass. How about we use it to help Americans in need? Or to perhaps secure our border? Maybe get our energy sector going again? Education? No, instead we’ll give it to one of the most corrupt countries in the world, where I’m sure most will be looted by corrupt politicians," he wrote on Twitter.

A little over a week ago, Tucker Carlson said,

"Inflation is higher than it's been in generations, maybe than it has been ever, depending on how you measure it," Carlson said.

"So Joe Biden's response is that he is going to print a lot more money and send it to the Government of Ukraine."

. . . "Shouldn't we have an audit of Zelensky's finances first?" Speaking mockingly, Tucker continued: "'Ooo shut up, that is Russian disinformation."

Among the tiny number of "no" votes on the lend-lease package was Madison Cawthorn, who himself has an established record as a fabulist and is dogged with ethics accusations, and who has previously called Zelensky "a thug". These appraisals are remarkably tone-deaf and to my mind call the judgment of Trump Jr, Carlson, and Cawthorn into question.

The first issue that comes to my mind is that there's an across-the-board consensus that Russian corruption has been a major factor in the astonishingly poor performance of the world's second largest army in Ukraine. This includes allegations that the generals have sold off critical components of the army's equipment and that they've padded the numbers in their units to collect the salaries of non-existent soldiers, as well as the imputation that senior officers are promoted for reasons other than military capability.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian armed forces have far outperformed expectations, sinking a major Russian warship, effectively denying Russia air superiority, and bringing the Russian blitzkrieg to a halt. If on one hand, Russian ineffectiveness can be attributed at least in part to corruption, to what can we attribute Ukrainian success? If Ukraine is corrupt, it must be far less so than Russia, judging at least by military effectiveness. By the same token, both Carlson and Trump Jr are clearly claiming that aid to Ukraine will be siphoned off in baksheesh, when every indication is that Ukraine is capably and effectively using every resource it's been given.

There are always red-flag indicators that trigger an audit (to be specific, this would be a "forensic" audit; there are also routine audits that are done periodically anywhere). The company's finance chief commits suicide, say. A branch VP suddenly buys a big yacht. A whistleblower goes to the IRS. Audits of this sort are the result of smoke-that-could-be-fire. As far as anyone can tell, Zelensky himself has no secret yachts in the Mediterranean. Much as Carlson and Trump Jr would like to find something like that, so far, nobody's come up with anything.

In fact, it said a great deal about Zelensky that the Biden administration apparently assumed he'd be like any other third-world dictator and flee the country with his cronies, mistresses, and pallets of cash, offering him a C-130 to skedaddle when the blitzkrieg got under way. His famous response was that he needed ammunition, not a ride.

The next factor to my mind is that handsome is as handsome does. I'm not the only person to note that his wartime leadership overall has been at the Lincoln or Churchill level. One key thing he's undersood has been that his job isn't just to rally the Ukrainian domestic population to make enormous sacrifice; it's been to make his case with world leaders. As a result, a country like Brazil, which has no dog in Ukraine's fight and had been neutral at best toward Ukraine, has turned around and pledged ammunition.

If Zelensky is on the take, it isn't showing in his job performance, which in part consists of a low-key, purposeful public persona reflecting a full-time dedication to the job at hand -- he dresses in khaki T-shirts and cargo pants and goes unshaven, sort of a Fidel Castro without the mugging for the camera. This isn't how oligarchs act.

The last factor I'd note is that as Aquinas says, sin dulls the intellect. For whatever reason, Putin convinced a generation of politicians that he was a brilliant guy, but when push came to shove, he turned out to be pretty dumb. On the other hand, Zelensky is turning out to be remarkably sharp. If he's using the office copier to file his tax returns, or if he's taking ballpoints home with him, I've got to think that's about the extent of it.

I don't know if Don Jr's views reflect those of Trump Sr. If they do, Trump is toast. The fact is that for whatever reason -- possibly because Secs Blinken and Austin have managed to cut out a sphere of discretion where Biden will just leave them alone -- Biden has somehow got on the right side of this issue and at least hasn't been badly damaging himself with it. I can't say the same for some swaths of the US Right.

Understanding Musk

There can be few better arguments for the idea that Twitter is, or had been, a de facto agency for government censorship than the Biden administration's proposal for a new Disinformation Governance Board only days after Twitter's directors accepted Elon Musk's buyout offer. But the ramifications go beyond the predictable political alignments. Witness the reaction of the Never Trump Hot Air blog:

Very encouraging that the new owner thinks it was bad form to silence a guy who had just incited a riot by conspiracy theorists at the Capitol and seemed capable of inciting a lot more amidst his mania to overturn the 2020 election.

Trump can rest easy now knowing that his mic won’t be cut the next time he tries a coup, I guess.

This report from the WSJ makes me consider a question to which only Elon Musk himself knows the answer. Namely, to what extent is buying a Twitter a business decision for him? Does he feel pure altruism in wanting to improve an influential communications platform by, among other things, trying to ensure that it treats all of its users fairly? Or are there bottom-line considerations?

I ask because it seems to me that having Donald Trump back on the platform would be good for business in various ways. Yeah, fine, “free speech” and all that. But there’s money to be made too.

Why bring Trump into this at all? Trump so far hasn't changed his position that he won't use Twitter again, but the writer's basic question here has nothing to do with Trump: is Musk doing this out of altruism, or is there money to be made? It sounds to me as though Allahpundit is as deeply suspicious of Musk as he is of Trump -- either Musk is naively altruistic (a billionaire? really?) or, like billionaire Trump himself, he's just cynically bottom-line.

The first thing Allahpundit doesn't understand about US million/billionaires is that most, even those mainly identified as tech moguls or steel-and-railroad industrialists, have always had either a direct investment in media or have at least clearly understood it. Thomas Edison was a pioneer in the film and record industries as well as light bulbs and utilities. Jay Gould, best known as one of the railroad robber barons, also controlled Western Union and worked closely with Edison to improve telegraph technology. His telegraph interests were always closely integrated with his railroads, with Western Union lines sharing rail rights of way.

William Randolph Hearst was a media mogul, though he also took an interest in politics. Joseph Kennedy was a stock market and real estate investor who branched into Hollywood. Steve Jobs was a tech innovator somewhat like Edison, but as he grew older, his focus was increasingly on media. Rockefeller Sr retired and put the family fortune under the control of Rockefeller Jr, who listened to Ivy Lee, the founder of modern public relations, effectively preserving the family's reputation through decades of attacks by muckrakers and socialists.

In that context, there's nothing unusual or particularly untrustworthy about Musk. An operator at that level is simply going to see opportunities in media that others will miss. Another skeptical piece from a different writer at Hot Air at least gets closer to Musk's likely intent:

Twitter has accepted Elon Musk’s offer but there are lots of people suggesting that Musk either can’t or won’t be able to complete the deal for various reasons.

. . . No sign from Musk that he’s having second thoughts so far but the idea of him changing course is certainly circulating at the moment. Another reason people are questioning the deal is that Twitter isn’t a very profitable company. Normally this type of leveraged buyout scenario would target a company that has a lot more profit.

. . . one way to make this deal make more sense would be to cut staffing dramatically.

So people are scratching their heads about Musk's motives but speculating there will be massive layoffs? What interests me here is that political writers like those at Hot Air, or indeed business writers, have apparently had no experience working in tech. I spent the latter years of my career commuting up to Silicon Valley, where the working environment is unique: free popcorn, free sodas, games in the break room, free beer on Fridays, set your own schedule, and the like.

I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings, but the people who work in that environment are spectacularly unproductive. I'd waste whole mornings waiting for my counterparts to get off the phone with their brokers. The UK Daily Mail has at least a suggestion of what might be on Musk's mind:

Twitter staff have been told that their jobs are safe for at least six months, until Elon Musk takes over under the terms of a $44 billion deal to take control of the company, agreed on Monday.

. . . Concerns about immediate job losses were allayed, with employees told that business will operate as usual until a deal closes in next six months, Bloomberg's Kurt Wagner reported.

Staff were told there would be no layoffs 'at this time' - but no guarantees were provided when Musk takes over.

. . . In internal message rooms there was uproar, The New York Times reported.

'I feel like im going to throw up..I rly don't wanna work for a company that is owned by Elon Musk,' one staffer said, according to their reporter Talmon Smith.

Smith's source told him that it was 'absolutely insane' in the internal chat rooms.

Another Twitter employee reportedly complained: 'I don't rly know what I'm supposed to do…oh my god, my phone's been blowing up…We have a meeting about it at 5pm…the CEO is going to address everyone about it' (it=elon).

I have a feeling the real concern at Twitter is less about whether Trump will be back than how many people will still get beer on Fridays. In some ways, that would be a move as interesting as a former Ukrainian comic driving the final stake into the heart of Stalinism, and nearly as consequential.

Twitter wasn't making money, but it was indulging and spoiling a bloated staff who, when some of them got around to it, were providing a free censorship service to the deep state. Musk is asking, as far as I can see, first, why this service is being provided for free, or indeed at all, and second, why so many people are doing no useful work. Drop the free stuff, both to the government and the workers, and produce something people will buy.

I'm not sure why anyone sees a problem here.

Rope-a-Dope

Accordding to Wikipedia,

The rope-a-dope is a boxing fighting technique in which one contender draws non-injuring offensive punches (sometimes while leaning against the rope of the boxing ring) to let the opponent tire themselves out. This gives the former the opportunity to then execute devastating offensive maneuvers to help them win. The rope-a-dope is most famously associated with Muhammad Ali in his October 1974 Rumble in the Jungle match against world heavyweight champion George Foreman in Kinshasa, Zaire.

It seems to me that the Ukrainian strategy, as well as defeat in detail, which I've discussed here, is also rope-a-dope. So far, I haven't seen any analysis of the war that covers this, which is an argument for staying away from sites like ISW and spending time on the reddit /r ukraine conflict site. Here is a thread there based on a Twitter thread that quotes a Russian's detailed account of his deployment in Donbas:

. . . At the start of March the brigade moved towards Rubezhnoe. Advanced from north. As witnesses described, on one of the forest roads at the approach to the town the column stopped and sent forward reconnaissance. Reconnaissance discovered two Ukrainian strong points. Ukrainians were not suspecting anything. For 40 minutes at the brigade they were deciding what to do. In this time, Ukrainians spotted the column and opened heavy fire from mortars and artillery. In this attack, the military personnel of our battalion halved without entering combat. Further I'll be writing about my own battalion, since I'm not familiar with actions of others.

At the time, myself together with Vit'ka and Irishman were in Luhansk trying to join the war, I wrote about this here. The Irishman through his acquaintances in hospital was claiming some monstrous numbers of 200's [killed in action] and 300's, [wounded] but I didn't believe back then. As I realised later, we couldn't leave because those who were meant to transfer us were busy delivering 300's and identifying 200's. Later, at the battalion location, light wounded who were coming back confirmed the losses.

After this defeat the battalion dismounted and laid down. Frost, snow, we laid down under shelling for three days. Starting fires was forbidden. Frostbitten in large numbers were added to the existing losses. Basically, by the time of the assault, only about a third of personnel was left in the battalion.

Next, with support of brigade artillery there was an assault of the northern part of town with 5-9 storeys buildings. Ukrainians didn't defend them and fairly quickly fell back to prepared positions in the private residential areas. At the end of March, Chechens housed in these buildings and posted staged videos about them 'heroically' cleaning up the 5-storey houses that were cleared two days before them.

Yet what began next was a complete f*ckery. As a strong point the Ukrainians used concrete garages . . .

They prepared positions superbly. South of the position was a low ground protecting from artillery. It was connected to communication pathways. At the ends of the streets leading north through the village were concrete pillboxes. In the village quarters 'fire bags' were organised beforehand - those were cleared crossfire sectors with machine gun points in basements and prepared sniper positions. And in those 'fire bags' were carefully laid pathways with smashed through sheds and fences. Fighters attempting reconnaissance by force go through yards so as to avoid going through streets that are shot-through. They don't know who made these pathways - possibly our own. And through these pathways they came under cross-fire of machine guns and snipers. Groups perished without even realising they were being shot at.

. . .A group entered one of those 'bags'. Immediately nine 200's. The commander was without a scratch. He came back, took more people, and went to pick up the 200's the same path. Had three more killed. And so - for a week. In the end, there were twenty 200's that couldn't be picked up for several weeks. An order to 'pull out 200's' became equivalent to 'go and die!

By mid-April, from the 'pre-war' personnel of our company only a couple people remained. Now they were sending volunteers and reservists into combat. Most volunteers had the experience of 2014-2015, but this was a totally different war and their experience wasn't helping with anything. And reservists - those were miners caught on the streets without any experience. No one cared. Grab the machine gun and go, under mortar fire. There was a catastrophic shortage of people, fighters weren't withdrawn from the frontline for a month and more. Many were losing their shit from the overload. Some started drinking heavily, thankfully there was no shortage of booze at the frontline. With pure mathematics, the chances of leaving the frontline alive and not wounded were close to zero. The longer you stay there, the fewer chances you have left. From those who I was friends or shared bread with, in two weeks eight people died. Others wounded or concussed. In a week, three company commanders changed - two perished. No officers of company-squad level were left at all.

In mid-April, after numerous attacks and big losses, the garages were finally captured. After a day, from the low ground came a Ukrainian tank and simply destroyed the garages to the ground. Ukrainian tanks work there completely unpunished. This 9-storey house neighbouring us, two Ukrainian tanks were taking apart for several hours - calmly and methodically. Where was our artillery looking at the time - f*ck knows.

But let's put this in the context of typical analysis by just about everyone of a "static" front in eastern Ukraine, for instance in this major think piece at the Red State blog:

The initial concept that appeared to be developing a double envelopment from the salients to the north and south is not [sic] more. Instead, the Russians have been making slow, methodical progress and seem to be limiting their attacks based on available supplies. The Ukrainians are giving ground grudgingly.

The account above from the Russian point of view is entirely different. Russian commanders are being enticed into what they think will be easy gains in Ukrainian-held villages, only to find their units horribly chewed up in pre-prepared kill "bags", with each perceived gain simply leading them into new traps. The Daily Kos assessment is also without insight:

Turns out, no one is making big sweeping gains. It’s all “lay down artillery until defenders get the f’ out, walk in. Leave when their artillery returns fire.” Rinse, lather, repeat.

I don't see this. The result oif Ukraine's strategy throughout the war so far has been to exhaust the Russian army as it makes ineffective punches without progress toward its objectives -- in short, rope-a-dope. The effectiveness of the strategy can be gauged, first, by the Russian withdrawal from the Kyiv axis, and now by the Russian appointment of its senior general, Valery Gerasimov, to take over command of the Donbas region from Southern Military District Commander Alexander Dvornikov, who had failed to achieve his expected objectives after only a short time in command as the enormous Russian losses continue.

And one thing the Ukrainians are really good at is wiping out generals when they visit the front lines. I think the Russians are much closer to a loss than the conventional wisdom thinks.

Bad Writing And Ukraine Analysis

I spent the first part of my working career making red (or blue) marks like those above, and I thereby learned what Samuel Johnson meant when he said teaching is "intricate misery". If I discovered anything else in the process, it was that bad writing has a close relation to bad thinking, but I'm not sure if I can go much beyond that.

This seems to apply to what passes for prestigious analysis of the current war in Ukraine, especially from the Institute for the Study of War. Let's take a passage from their April 26 update:

Russian forces have adopted a sounder pattern of operational movement in eastern Ukraine, at least along the line from Izyum to Rubizhne. Russian troops are pushing down multiple roughly parallel roads within supporting distance of one another, allowing them to bring more combat power to bear than their previous practice had supported.

This could actually be a good introductory sentence for several subsequent paragraphs giving specific instances, but it's followed only by a few sentences that are essentially unsupported:

Russian troops on this line are making better progress than any other Russian advances in this phase of the war. They are pushing from Izyum southwest toward Barvinkove and southeast toward Slovyansk. They are also pushing several columns west and south of Rubizhne, likely intending to encircle it and complete its capture.

They're pushing, and they're pushing, and they'll likely, but if they're so much sounder, why haven't they done it yet? The whole story of the eastern front so far has been that it's static. Contrast this assessment with yesterday's analysis from the Daily Kos, which I think is better written and probably more accurate, though less prestigious:

Russia continued making slow, grinding progress on Wednesday, taking five settlements, repulsed on six other approaches, and pushing into some of the larger towns. Ukrainian resistance is stiff.

I won’t belabor the point I’ve made repeatedly—how Russia [is] guilty once again of spreading its forces thin across way too many lines of attack. Yes, they’ve had some tactical victories, taking a town here or there, but they are still failing their strategic goal of taking the entire Donbas region and building a land bridge that extends all the way across Ukraine’s south, through Odesa, and on to Moldova’s Transnistria region.

Remember, Russia had loads of tactical victories around Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. How’d that turn out for them strategically?

. . . It’s been two weeks since Russia announced their big Donbas offensive, yet Russia has managed to push only ~22 kilometers (14 miles) to the south and west. That leaves just another 240-320 kilometers (~150-200 miles) of roads to go to close the gap to the south (depending on the route), not to mention all the territory in the middle, which at around 5,000 square miles, would entirely fit the state of Connecticut.

The Daily Kos analysis is far more concrete and even asks pertinent questions, which the ISW analysis completely leaves out. Now, I'm interested in this war, and being retired, I have time on my hands, so I'm able to look around for the best information. In general, the ISW is currently unique in insisting the Russians have cleaned up their act -- but the question remains that if their operational pattern is now sounder, as the ISW claims, why aren't we seeing them benefit from it? This is effectively the point the Daily Kos is raising.

The ISW says the Russians are making "better progress", but there's no specific comparison. This is no different from claiming our detergent will get your clothes 50% cleaner. The Russian progress so far is actually similar to what we saw around Kyiv, which is the point the Daily Kos makes. There, we saw seesawing along a largely static front, followed soon enough by a complete Russian collapse.

It's worth noting that the lead author of the April 26 ISW post I've linked here as a bad example is again Frederick W Kagan, the Ivy Leaguer with a PhD in Russian and Soviet military history, and who as I noted more than two weeks ago, seems inclined not just to repeat conventional wisdom but to create it himself ex nihilo. There's been a school of thought that goes more or less, "Just wait. The Russians are going to regroup, recalibrate, and refit, and we'll see a real advance n the Donbas." But so far, other than an advance here countered by a retreat there, we still aren't seeing it, but Kagan is sticking to his guns, and I think he's even jiggering his analysis to accommodate it.

And this leaves aside the increasing reports that the US-NATO heavy artillery that had been moving to Ukraine over the past two weeks is reaching the front, along with the trained Ukraine units to use it. The best reports I've been able to find are still at the reddit r/ ukraine conflict site. They are anecdotal and often unconfirmed, but I think they're a good counterbalance to the more respectable but badly written and badly reasoned analysis elsewhere.

Boy, That Was Fast

So fat, I haven't seen any commentary that ties the events of the past two weeks together.

• April 14: Elon Musk offers to buy Twitter
• April 18: U.S. District Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle strikes down the federal mask mandate for airplanes and other modes of public transportation
• April 21: CNN announces cacellation of CNN+
• April 22: Florida Gov Ron DeSantis signs bill revoking special Disney status in the state
• April 25: Twitter board unanimously accepts Musk buyout offer.

In the space of a week and a half, the country took important steps to bring itself out of the 2020 moral panic. This included a major defeat for woke control of key news and entertainment and a near-final end to most COVID restrictions. There's been a lot of reaction to each individual event, especially the Musk takeover of Twitter, but nobody's seeing this as a much bigger milestone.

If I were to go farther with the big picture, I'd say this is taking place in the context of the Ukraine war. Again, few people are noting the effect of Volodymyr Zelensky as a world figure, although some are, interestingly in the context of the Aristotelian virtues, especially courage. For instance, at the UK Tablet,

The heroic struggle of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky against the tyrant Putin’s invasion of Ukraine represents nothing less than the return of noble manliness in our era. Improbably, he rose from portraying a Ukrainian president on a hit comedy series to becoming president in real life. His dressed-down khaki jacket and T-shirt shows solidarity with ordinary Ukrainians and has an Israeli feel. Don’t do what I ask because I’m president, he says. Do it because you’re Ukrainian.

, , , The idea of manly virtue has been discounted for many years now in our institutions of higher learning, frequently identified with “toxic masculinity” and other supposed threats to proper order. The caricature of manliness that our institutions now offer us is identified exclusively with barbarism and misogyny. . . . The classical standard for true manliness was still witnessed in modern democratic politics with leaders like Lincoln and Churchill. Though neither man was free of flaws, they had an inner compass that at their best moments guided what they aspired to be and how they governed. The emergence of Zelensky reminds us that such leaders can still emerge from the Western masculine ideal.

I've mentioned both Lincoln and Churchill in connection with Zelensky here. Churchill in particular was addressing a multinational audience, in particular due to the need for the UK to enlist American support against Hitler and Japan. Zelensky's task has been even bigger, to address the need first, for NATO and the West to abandon policies of appeasement toward Putin at all, and then for NATO and the West to man up against the fear that offending Putin by sending Ukraine heavy weapons would "start World War III".

His ability to do this, especially to move a weak, corrupt, and feminized US president who urged him to flee the country in the first hours of the invasion, gradually, first into not objecting to minimal aid to Ukraine (though apparently vetoing the transfer of Polish Migs), but eventually giving the US generals a free hand in providing whatever weapons and other assistance Zelensky requested, speaks for virtue at a classical and historic level. This is beyond David and Goliath; it's maybe, as a few have noted, more like Moses and Pharaoh.

Let's look at Wikipedia's account of how Elon Musk decided to take over Twitter:

On March 20, 2022, the Twitter account of conservative satire website The Babylon Bee was suspended for referring to U.S. Assistant Secretary for Health Rachel Levine, a transgender woman, as their "Man of The Year", which Twitter stated violated its policy on "hateful conduct". The Babylon Bee refused to delete the tweet in order to regain access to the account, and Twitter rejected their appeal. According to Babylon Bee CEO Seth Dillon, the website was contacted by Musk shortly after the suspension to confirm whether they had been suspended, who mused that he "might need to buy Twitter". On March 24, Musk began tweeting statements critical of Twitter, polling his followers on whether Twitter adhered to the principle that "free speech is essential to a functioning democracy"

Wikipedia makes the point that as early as 2017, in response to a tweet suggesting Musk buy Twitter, he replied, "How much is it?", and Musk had been accumulating Twitter shares since January 2022, before anyone knew the name Zelensky. Nevertheless, it's hard to avoid the idea that Zelensky's leadership has created an atmosphere in which Musk could succeed in his bid, and certainly in which his bid could become viable.

The forces of wokeness have been in disorder since the middle of this month, but maybe even more significant, so has a certain segment of the Right. Tucker Carlson, who'd originally seemed likely to inherit Rush Limbaugh's mantle, has retained his anti-Zelensky position. The never-Trump Right is opposed to Musk's takeover of Twitter, as well as DeSantis's revocation of Disney's special treatment in Florida.

My take on Limbaugh is he'd have been pro-Zelensky, pro-Ukraine from the start. I'm really sorry we don't have his commentary now. More is happening than in Ukraine, but Ukraine is oddly driving the rest of it.

Just Say No

The meme above is from Roy, a guy I first met 40 years ago. To say he is something of a character is an understatement. His main post-retirement activity is to dress to the nines and take selfies at LA cultural sites, of which there are many, and post them on Facebook, so he's busy. Recently he's been taking maskless selfies on Metrolink trains to make the point that even before last week's order from Judge Mizelle, Metrolink staff had stopped enforcing the mask mandates, we must assume with the tacit endorsement of both their union and management.

Last week I posted on what I speculated was Metrolink's dilemma when "Dr" Barbara Ferrer, the LA County health director, issued an order saying that despite the TSA's ceasing mask enforcement, with Amtrak and the airlines following suit, public transit in LA County must continue to enforce masking. Among the problems I saw in this was that Metrolink operates in four other counties besides LA, and a train that starts in LA County usually finishes its run in one of the others. Can people take off their masks when the train leaves the county?

Roy provided a link to a clarification in his Facebook post:

Confusion in trains as riders in Orange County and Inland Empire asked to wear masks – again.

"I thought that was over" and "I don’t have one" were the most common phrases we heard at train stations along the Metrolink lines outside Los Angeles County. Earlier this week, riders heard they no longer had to wear masks after a federal judge struck down the Biden Administration's mask mandate on planes and other forms of public transportation stating that the mandate exceeded the authority of U.S. health officials.

However, Los Angeles County health officials are, again, mandating masks on public transit, citing a rise in COVID-19 infection rates. As a result, Metrolink officials are asking riders on its system, even in lines and stations not in LA County, to wear masks.

"We are not kicking people out if they are not wearing them," said Scott Johnson, director of Communications at Metrolink.

Johnson forwarded FOX 11 the following statement, explaining Metrolink's position:

"Following the County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health issuing a Health Officer Order that masking in all public transit within LA County and in LA County indoor transportation hubs continues to be required, Metrolink is asking all passengers aboard Metrolink trains systemwide to once again wear a mask aboard all Metrolink trains.

Just as we did Monday when Metrolink followed a federal directive to lift the mask mandate, we will continue to monitor the situation and adjust as needed with passenger safety as the focus."

The back and forth is making it difficult for many riders we spoke to. Even those who prefer to wear masks, and had them, admit it can be confusing. One rider explained he and his wife just got off a plane, where they were glad to not have to wear a mask, and find that having to wear it on a much emptier train seems unnecessary. Still, many we talked to say they will comply, and plan on carrying masks on their person, regardless. Others say they will refuse, and stop catering to businesses that insist on it, be it a restaurant, and yes, even the train.

A basic principle that's being proven in all the COVID restrictions is that off-again-on-again eventually makes them unenforceable, especially when jurisdictions conflict. A bigger problem for LA County is that its order specifically listed one condition for ending it would be if the CDC ends its own mask mandate, which is effectively suspended anyhow just about everywhere but LA County and some New York area agencies. The current CDC extension is set to end on May 3, a week away.

I would guess that Metrolink was in a bind, as there must have been some type of discussion with the union on whether employees were required to enforce masking -- I assume this was never in the contract, and employees didn't want to continue to do it, especially if having to remove recalictrants from a train and risk of personal harm was involved. So Metrolink is publicly splitting the baby, saying they'll "ask" but not enforce, hoping it won't last long.

As of now, we have no news on whether the CDC intends to ask for yet another extension, but even if they do, in light of the fact that it's no longer enforced in most of the country, its days are numbered no matter what. Overall, in light of the damage the lockdowns and business restrictions did, it's probably just as well that the public health establishment has effectively destroyed its credibility for years to come. Let's face it, this has been the main contribution of Drs Fauci, Walensky, and Levine, as well as "Dr" Ferrer, to the general public welfare.

And Roy, of course, is right.

What's The Story On Ukraine?

I'm still puzzled at the horrible quality of Ukraine war analysis. Here's a snippet of yesterday's assessment from the Institute for the Study of War:

CORRECTION: ISW mistakenly reported on April 23 that Russian troops seized Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast, approximately 100km west of Izyum. Russian troops actually seized Lozove, Donetsk Oblast, approximately 35km east of Izyum. We apologize for the error.

Every few days there's something like this. The authors listed at the top of yesterday's assessment are Mason Clark and Kateryna Stepanenko. Stepanenko is a Ukrainian name, and I assume that Ms Stepanenko is a native speaker and (at least presumably) famiiar with the country's geography. As far as I can see, this would be roughly equivalent to a California writer confusing Monterey, CA with Monterey Park, CA, locations 325 miles apart, an extremely sloppy error. I don't know what staff members at ISW make, but I've got to think whatever it is, it's too much.

The same ISW assessments had been predicting complete Russian victory in Mariupol "within days" throughout March and the first weeks of April, when the defenders in the Azov steel plant have continued to hold out and as of today are still being resupplied.

The question I have is whether the level of incompetence we see at the ISW also reflects a similar level in our intelligence and defense planning -- I assume staff at think tanks pass interchangeably into intelligence agencies, and this could well explain how the US utterly miscalculated the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Zelensky's ability to rally not just his own country but much of the West. The Mason Clarks and Kateryna Stepanenkos are presumably keeping up their mortgage payments in Bethesda nonetheless.

A New Yorker piece, Is the Russian Military a Paper Tiger? raises this question at least tangentially. The author interviews Joel Rayburn, a retired Army colonel now at a think tank, who suggests the whole Russian plan for invasion was unworkable from the start:

I think, over all, the campaign design was flawed from the start. It was an invasion force that was too small for the task, just in straight numbers—in the numbers of combat units, combat formations they were able to put on the battlefield. That task was essentially to dismember Ukraine and change the regime in Kyiv, and the force was too small for that purpose.

. . . What we can now see is that they simply do not have the institutional capacity to support offensive operations deep into enemy territory and aren’t able to give units supply and combat support of all kinds: artillery support, air support, air-defense support. With an already weak logistics base, it was an enormous mistake for them to chop their main offensive into four major axes that were widely geographically dispersed.

. . . And then they’re showing up on the battlefield in the axis of advance toward Kharkiv and Chernihiv and Kyiv with Cold War-era, non-modernized, armored combat vehicles—both infantry vehicles and tanks. And it’s like they took these things out of mothballs.

. . . What we’ve seen in action is a military machine on the Russian side that could not pull off a confrontation with any NATO power. So escalating into a confrontation with NATO would be suicidal for them. And I have to believe that they’re not suicidal. Imagine if that invasion force had stumbled into Poland instead. The casualties that we’re seeing now are high enough, but the entire invasion force would’ve been wiped out.

All well and good, but, er, even Col Rayburn is talking as though this was a surprise (and I assume his mortgage in Bethesda is up to date as well). Why was all this a surprise? US intelligence has made a point that it did in fact correctly predict Putin's invasion in late February -- but what about everything it's failed to predict since then? The mantra up until very recently was "we don't want to start World War III" by offending Putin in some way, like sending Ukraine heavy weapons or Migs.

Thankfully that's been dropped once the level of Russian incompetence became clear. But what caused our own massive miscalculation in the West? I wonder if these aren't the nieces, nephews, and Ivy League protégés of the same people who brought us the failure to predict the Soviet collapse more than a generation ago.